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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When many Americans think of hate crime, they immediately consider the brutal 
killings of James Byrd in Texas and Matthew Shepard in Wyoming. Targeted because 
one was African American and the other a homosexual, both men suffered abuse at the 
hands of those who allegedly selected them because of the color of one’s skin and sexual 
orientation of the other.  Media coverage and resulting public outcry to punish the 
offenders for hate crimes brought the issue to the fore, while at the same time creating 
confusion in the minds of citizens who did not understand the complexities of 
prosecuting such a crime,1  because unlike any other crime in the American judicial 
system, a hate crime prosecutor is required to prove what was in the minds of an attacker 
(Deputy DA Jim Hackleman, personal interview, July 21, 2003).   
The term “hate crime” is relatively new in American jurisprudence. According to 
James Jacobs (1997), the first mention of a hate crime in the American media occurred in 
1985, when a review of the nation’s newspapers revealed 11 such stories.  Ten years later 
he found more than a thousand stories on the topic of hate or bias crime.  Jacobs and 
Henry (1996) contend that politicians, the media, some criminologists and interest groups 
insist that a “hate crime epidemic” is sweeping across America, requiring new and more 
stringent bias crime laws, and giving an unbalanced view of hate crime. For example, a 
LEXIS search of news articles from 1993 to 1995 revealed a total of 56 stories that 
referred to the “epidemic of hate crime” (Jacobs & Henry, p.370).   
                                                 
1 The men convicted of both James Byrd’s and Matthew Shepard’s murders were not charged with hate 
crimes because neither Texas nor Wyoming had hate crime statutes at the time.   
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Despite the contention by some that all crime is motivated by hate or that certain 
groups have perpetually been targets of hate and bias-related vengeance, hate as a 
codified crime has only existed since the 1980s in some states, and for much less time in 
others. For the federal government, hate crime became something to count, rather than 
something to prosecute, which will be explained later. 
Much public and media attention has been paid to murders committed under the 
guise of hatred, but murders make up less than one percent of hate crimes in the United 
States. The great majority of criminal offenses that are prosecuted as hate crimes are 
intimidation, assault, or property crimes such as vandalism.  Despite the much higher 
incidence of these less notorious offenses, limited data exist, and few studies have been 
done that consider the types of crimes that prosecutors face every day, and the subjective 
decisions that are made regarding them.  Some research has focused on the various hate 
groups (Blee, 1991, 2002; Hamm, 1993), the evolution of hate crime laws (Jenness & 
Grattet, 1996, 2001; Soule & Earl, 2001) and the necessity of hate crime laws (Jacobs & 
Potter, 1997, 1998; Weinstein, 1992; Murphy, 1992; Gellman, 1992, Lawrence, 1999).  
 Jenness and Grattet (2001) studied hate crime policy and enforcement, along with 
many others (Bell, 2000; Jacobs & Potter, 1998; McPhail, 2000; Walker & Katz, 1995; 
Morsch, 1991).  Other researchers (Boyd, Berk and Hammer, 1996; Bell 2000) have used 
qualitative methods to review how police investigate crimes in metropolitan areas, and 
though they provide useful insight into the workings of law enforcement’s role in hate 
crime investigation, both fall short of the actual discretionary decision-making process 
and the characteristics of the prosecutors themselves. To date, there appears to be no 
research that provides an in-depth look at the people who prosecute hate crime cases, and 
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what influences them to make the decisions that they make.  Instead, the existing research 
focuses on the role of police, with some emphasis placed on the problems associated with 
law enforcement’s reporting of the applicable data. 
Hate crime statistics are unreliable and fraught with discrepancies. Although 
perhaps helpful in terms of evaluating trends, the method of data collection, reporting 
practices, and changing interpretations of hate crime lead to unreliable statistics.  There is 
no nationwide database that captures data on hate crime prosecution and disposition, and 
while California is the only state that requires prosecutors to report the number of hate 
crime cases filed, along with the outcomes of bias crime cases, the number of cases is too 
few in any given year to allow for reliable quantitative examination.  Changing policies 
within police agencies and prosecutors’ offices can also impact the number of cases filed, 
therefore, using the numbers for comparison is flawed.  Consequently, qualitative 
research may offer the best hope of understanding which crimes are filed, how decisions 
are made, and who the people are who make those determinations. 
This study used qualitative methods to explore how decisions concerning hate 
crime cases in California are made by those who daily determine, without oversight, 
which crimes will be prosecuted and which will not.  I looked at how prosecutors make 
their decisions, what factors they consider in making their determinations, and how their 
personal feelings may impact their decisions.  My study includes interviews of eighteen 
hate crime prosecutors in California, all of whom have considerable prosecutorial 
experience.  It also includes data from a set of hate crime scenarios that were evaluated 
by those same prosecutors, who rated the scenarios according to how likely he or she 
would be to charge the case as a hate crime.  Using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
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1967), I have identified two types of prosecutors that I have labeled procedural 
prosecutors and personal prosecutors.  What emerged was a sharp contrast between the 
two types of prosecutors, and the latter were the real mavericks who deviated from the 
accepted standards, procedures, and limitations by which most prosecutors abide.  The 
former, however, are equally important in that they represent the majority of my sample. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
CURRENT LAW AND HATE CRIME DATA 
 
 
Introduction 
 As of September 2003, the Federal Government, and forty-five states had some 
type of statute regarding hate crime. However, the definition of and the reporting of hate 
crime in the US varies widely.  This chapter looks at the definitions of hate crime at the 
federal and California level, as well as how the crime of hate is counted by governments. 
I pay attention to the problem of voluntary data submission and how it skews the overall 
picture of the problem of hate crime in the United States. Since California has mandatory 
hate crime reporting as well as prosecution reporting, I focus on the state’s hate crime 
statistics, including the tracking of cases prosecuted.   I also look at the differences 
between the prosecution of federal and state hate crimes and briefly, the current state of 
police training in hate crime investigations. 
 
Federal Law 
The current federal law (18 USC 245) enacted in 1968, permits prosecution of 
crimes deemed to be motivated by a bias of race, color, religion, national origin or 
ethnicity. However, the statute is limited to the categories of bias listed above, and even 
then only in instances of crimes committed on federal property, or when a victim is 
engaged in activities protected under federal law (such as voting or attending school).  
Specifically, the United State Attorney’s Office has clear jurisdiction over those crimes 
committed on federal property, or when the victim is engaging in a protected activity if 
   
 6
the crime was motivated by a bias detailed in 18 USC 245.  However, under a separate 
federal statute (28 USC 994), if a person is otherwise convicted of a federal offense, and 
it has been proven that the crime was bias motivated, “based on the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation” 
the sentencing judge is allowed the option of “sentence enhancement” and may increase 
the sentence of a criminal so convicted by three “levels.”  
 Under 28 USC 994 (the same statute that governs sentence enhancement), the 
Federal Department of Justice further expands its definition of a hate crime as follows: 
Hate crime is the violence of intolerance and bigotry, intended to hurt and 
intimidate someone because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religious, 
sexual orientation, or disability.  The purveyors of hate use explosives, arson, 
weapons, vandalism, physical violence, and very threats of violence to instill fear 
in their victims, leaving them vulnerable to more attacks and feeling alienated, 
helpless, suspicious and fearful.  Others may become frustrated and angry if they 
believe the local government and other groups in the community will not protect 
them.  When perpetrators of hate are not prosecuted as criminals and their acts not 
publicly condemned, their crimes can weaken even those communities with the 
healthiest race relations (www.parishioners.org). 
 
 
Federal Reporting and Data Collection 
In response to a growing concern about hate crimes in America, President George 
H. W. Bush signed Public Law 101-275, the “Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990,” (28 
USC 534) on April 23, 1990.  Prior to that time, the only data available were those 
provided by organizations like the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty 
Law Center, which advocated for the hate crime bill (Jacobs & Potter, 1997). This act 
ultimately required the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect data, as part of the 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), “about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice 
based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate, the 
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crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple 
assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property” 
(www.fbi.gov/ucr/traing99). Four years later, in 1994, the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act amended the Hate Crime Statistics Act to add disabilities, both 
physical and mental, as factors that could be considered a basis for hate crimes.  These 
two laws were not about prosecuting crimes, but were simply about counting them. 
In deciding how to collect hate crime data, the UCR Program considered two 
approaches. The first approach was to conduct an in-depth analysis of suspected bias-
motivated incidents based on a national sample. This approach would have required 
approximately 800 select law enforcement agencies to identify and track cases suspected 
of being hate crimes through the investigatory and prosecution processes, and then report 
findings regarding the offenses that they determined to have been motivated by hatred 
(www.fbi.gov/ucr/traing99). Much like the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(NCVS), which uses a nationwide random sample to estimate crime rates, this type of 
data collection promised to be more comprehensive.  However, analysts felt that the 
sampling approach would not provide statistically significant breakdowns of local, state, 
or regional data. There were also concerns about the fiscal burdens brought on by this 
method, and ultimately the sampling method was dropped.  In contrast, because of the 
important national picture it might provide regarding hate crime, the UCR Program staff 
believed that using their existing method would achieve the most valid assessment of the 
national problem of hate crime activity (www.fbi.gov/ucr/traing99).   
 The approach that was adopted, then, incorporates hate crime data into the already 
established nationwide UCR Program.  This method of data collection was attractive 
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because it did not require major resource commitments from individual police agencies, 
and it could provide statistical data broken down into geographical locations.  It was 
assumed that law enforcement agencies would voluntarily provide the data, using the 
required data collection form. Unfortunately, only about two-thirds of police agencies 
submit information regarding their hate crime incidents, and the result is an incomplete, if 
not unreliable, report on hate crime in the United States. 
 The first Federal data on hate crimes were collected for the year 1990. The report 
examined hate crime statistics from eleven participating states. By 2002, still only 64 
percent of agencies nationwide were reporting, and of those, only 15.5 percent submitted 
hate crime reports. Levin and McDevitt (2002) explained that a survey conducted by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2000 found that only 45 percent of the police departments 
across the country had a formal hate crime investigation policy in place. 
As a case in point, the racially and ethnically diverse city of Nashville, Tennessee, 
-- the nation’s 22nd largest city -- had no hate crimes in the year 2001, according to FBI 
statistics.  Memphis, Tennessee, a nearby city, which is approximately the same size, and 
equally diverse, reported 47 hate crimes during that same year. When questioned by a 
local newspaper about the disparity, the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department 
admitted investigating 109 cases of hate crime in the year 2000, and 78 cases in 2001. 
When asked why the FBI data had no data on these crimes, a police spokesperson said 
“We have not done a very good job of bean counting” (qtd. in Bottorf, 2000). 
If the twenty-second largest city in the United States does not report its hate crime 
numbers, how many others fail to do so? Why do so many agencies fail to report? Part of 
the problem comes from a lack of expertise or training: A reporting body cannot report 
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what it does not fully understand. A hate crime is one of the most difficult and 
complicated to investigate, since motive is the key factor, and the minds and motives of 
those who commit crimes of hatred are inscrutable to even the most experienced police 
investigators. 
 The dilemma brought about by the inconsistencies in hate crimes reported to the 
FBI is evident in a comparison of the 2002 crime statistics of two states:  California is the 
most populous state in the U.S., with an overall crime rate that ranked 25th in the year 
2002. The state reported the second highest number of hate crimes per capita that year, 
exceeded only by Arizona. At the same time the state of Arkansas, which is the 33rd 
largest state in the country, reported an overall crime rate that ranked them 23rd among 
the 50 states. Arkansas reported no hate crimes in 2002. 
Almost certainly, with a total crime rate higher than half of U.S. states, including 
California, Arkansas must have experienced some hate crime during 2002.  Indeed, the 
following year, Arkansas reported 177 hate crimes. (Interestingly, Arkansas does not 
have a state hate crime law, but for the year 2003 submitted reports on 177 hate 
“incidents.”)  There are other states with similarly high crime rates, yet they report few 
hate crimes. Other states with relatively low crime rates, such as Minnesota, may report a 
disproportionately high number of hate incidents. Clearly, better documentation and 
reporting is essential to a better understanding of this issue. 
 Because the reporting of hate crime data across states seems to be so unreliable, it 
is difficult to know whether there is actually more hate crime committed in California and 
Arizona, or whether law enforcement agencies in those two states simply are more 
diligent in reporting.. However, these problems should not preclude an exploratory 
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examination of the patterns found in rates of hate crime among the states.  In a 
preliminary analysis of UCR hate crime rates, using the average for 2002-2003, Jensen 
and Woods (2005) found that in the United States, the Northeast and West report the 
highest rates of hate crime, while the South reports the lowest rate of bias motivated 
incidents. 
 
Hate Crime in California – History and Background 
 California’s hate crime reporting system was implemented by the California 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in September 1994.  DOJ required that law enforcement 
agencies incorporate a two-tier decision-making process when it comes to hate crimes, 
the same type of system recommended by the FBI (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).  The first 
level is done by the initial officer who responds to the suspected hate crime incident.  At 
the second level, at least one other officer reviews the report to confirm that the offense 
constitutes a hate crime. DOJ acknowledges that its hate crime data are influenced by a 
number of factors, such as cultural practices of potential victim groups and likeliness of 
reporting crimes to law enforcement, the level of commitment by law enforcement 
agencies, and the amount of training and resources devoted to hate crimes (Lockyer, 
2001, p. 48). 
The California Penal Code defines a hate crime as follows: 
 422.6. (a) No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or 
threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any 
other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to 
him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation, or because he or 
she perceives that the other person has one or more of those characteristics. 
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   (b) No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall knowingly deface, 
damage, or destroy the real or personal property of any other person for the 
purpose of intimidating or interfering with the free exercise or enjoyment of any 
right or privilege secured to the other person by the Constitution or laws of this 
state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States, because of the other 
person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or 
sexual orientation, or because he or she perceives that the other person has one or 
more of those characteristics. 
 
The punishment upon conviction under this statute is as follows: 
 
   (c) Any person convicted of violating subdivision (a) or (b) shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed 
five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, and the 
court shall order the defendant to perform a minimum of community service, not 
to exceed 400 hours, to be performed over a period not to exceed 350 days, 
during a time other than his or her hours of employment or school attendance.  
However, no person shall be convicted of violating subdivision (a) based upon 
speech alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence 
against a specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat. 
 
 Under California Penal Code section 594 (the typical vandalism statute), 
damage resulting from vandalism must be in excess of $400 in order to warrant 
significant jail time or fine, and most often, community service is the sentence, if there is 
a sanction at all.  Under the hate crime statute, the potential sentence is only slightly 
different – up to a year in county jail or fine, or both.  In addition, however, the law states 
that the court shall order the defendant to perform community service, in addition to any 
other fine.  With the crime of intimidation, however, the difference becomes much more 
evident.  Under California law, intimidation had not been codified as criminal, except for 
intimidation of a witness, until the adoption of the hate crime section.  A person 
convicted of intimidation under the hate crime statute can receive both imprisonment and 
a fine. 
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California’s Hate Crime Data Collection 
 Unlike the federal system, the Attorney General of California requires that all law 
enforcement agencies within the state report “events” of hate crime.  California was the 
first state to pass its own state hate crimes statute in 1978, and in accordance with 
California Penal Code section 13023, began gathering data in 1994, with a full year of 
reporting for 1995.  The Attorney General, through the California Department of Justice, 
publishes an annual report. The California report differs from FBI report data in a number 
of ways.  First, as previously mentioned, all law enforcement agencies in California are 
required to report; the federal system is voluntary.  Second, California requires district 
attorneys and elected city attorneys to submit annual summaries of the number of hate 
crime cases referred to them, as well as initial filings, prosecutions and eventual 
dispositions.  This information is important because it can help assess the relative value 
of using hate crime laws for prosecution.  Third, the California program counts hate 
crime robbery as a violent crime, whereas the federal system categorizes hate crime 
robbery as a property crime.2 
 In the year 2005, California law enforcement agencies reported a total of 1,397 
hate crime events involving 1,691 offenses, compared to 1,409 events with 1,170 
offenses in 2004.3  Figure 1 shows California hate crime reports by county for the year 
2005: 
                                                 
2 For crimes other than hate crimes, the FBI counts robbery as a violent crime or a “persons crime.” 
3 An “event” may have more than one victim or may include one or more offenses. 
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      Figure 1: Hate Crime Reports by County 2005  
 
Values N
0 T o 2 (21)
3 T o 6 (12)
9 T o 20 (13)
21 T o 507 (12)
Miss ing Data
Rptd 05 -- Rptd 05
 
 
(Source: Hate Crime in California 2005. CA Dept of Justice.) 
 
Violent crime comprised 65 percent of the events reported in 2005, and property 
crimes accounted for the remaining 35 percent.  Nearly half of all events categorized as 
violent crime involved intimidation, and more than a third involved simple assault.  
Intimidation and both types of assaults, simple and aggravated, comprised nearly 95 
percent of all hate crimes.  Murder was only 0.1 percent.  
Of the 595 property crimes reported in 2005, nearly 93 percent involved 
destruction or vandalism. Destruction or vandalism has been the number one property 
crime since data collection began in California; from 1998 to 2005, it has accounted for 
more than 90 percent of property crimes in bias-motivated cases (Lockyer, 2005, p. 3).  It 
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is important to note that, when examining the crime of vandalism, it can often be linked 
to intimidation, where racial or ethnic epithets or graffiti on walls could produce as much 
fear in the victim as an actual physical confrontation.  There is no way to assess or 
compare the impact of the two types of hate crimes, violent and property, but according 
to the American Psychological Association, the symptoms of depression, anxiety, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder are often present in the victims of all types of hate crimes 
(www.apa.org).   
Table 1 shows a breakdown of hate crime offenses reported to the California 
Department of Justice for the year 2005: 
 
Table 1 
Hate Crime Offenses in California 2005 
           
Crimes against Persons     Number 
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter           1   
Forcible rape               1 
Aggravated assault        317 
Simple assault         298 
Intimidation                   443 
Robbery           36 
Total                  1,096 
 
Crimes against Property      Number 
Burglary                      27 
Larceny-theft                         5 
Motor vehicle theft            3 
Arson              7 
Destruction/damage/vandalism      553         
Total                   595 
       
Grand total of all offenses               1,691 
 
(Source: Hate Crime in California, 2005. CA Dept of Justice.) 
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 The collection of hate crime data in California was previously done in a similar 
manner to the one used by the FBI: reports were mailed to DOJ headquarters. Analysts 
reviewed each hate crime event report (which usually consists of the face sheet of the 
actual crime report) to ensure that it met the criteria required for inclusion in the hate 
crime statistics a follow-up was sometimes necessary.  In 2002 analysts at DOJ rejected 
16 percent of the hate crime reports because they did not meet the criteria for inclusion.4 
Beginning in late 2003, DOJ required agencies to submit their hate crime reports via a 
system that DOJ calls HATE (Hate Crime Analysis, Tracking and Evaluation), a web-
enabled database that collects the data.  Additionally, the system can be used by 
investigators for intelligence purposes. Information such as details about incidents, 
persons, groups, businesses, vehicles, weapons, property, locations, financial accounts 
and investigating personnel can be accessed by authorized investigators using a 
“relational database management system.” This relationship “wizard” shows connections 
among specified variables within the system. 
In 2005 California prosecutors filed a total of 330 hate crimes out of the 448 that 
were referred by law enforcement to county district attorneys and city attorneys, or 74 
percent.5  A total of 274 cases resulted in a disposition during 2005, while the others were 
pending disposition.  Slightly more than 13 percent of those hate crime cases resulted in 
no conviction, while nearly 37 percent resulted in convictions for offenses other than a 
hate crime.  Still, one half of those cases resulted in a conviction for a hate crime. A total 
of 25 hate crime cases in California in 2005 resulted in a conviction by verdict. 
Dispositions, number of cases filed and the number of incidents or offenses reported 
                                                 
4 Typically, the reason for rejection was the police report’s lack of clearly documented bias motivation.  
5 The percentage of referred hate crimes prosecuted (as hate crimes) in 2003 was 66%, and in 2004 was 
68%. 
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cannot be compared, and DOJ does not attempt to do so, since offenses, arrests, filings 
and dispositions rarely fit neatly into a calendar year.   
 
Federal Prosecution of Hate Crime 
 The United States Attorney’s Office has the ability to choose among the local law 
enforcement cases for cases that it wants to prosecute, provided those cases meet the 
minimum requirements under the federal statute.  Strapped by limited resources, as well 
as state prosecutors who may lack training, local law enforcement agencies will often 
look to the federal authorities for assistance.  When a hate or bias crime case comes 
along, some FBI and US Attorneys’ offices are eager to become involved.  Typically, 
federal prosecutors have higher conviction rates than their state counterparts in all 
criminal cases, partly because they have luxury of choosing them from local law 
enforcement agencies. Perhaps more importantly, federal offices are not burdened by the 
overwhelming numbers of criminal complaints that typically flood district attorney and 
city attorney offices. 
 I spoke with a prominent federal prosecutor who told me that often a prosecutor’s 
office learns about a hate crime through newspaper or television.  Cases that attract the 
attention of these prosecutors must meet the criteria mentioned earlier: the crime must be 
motivated by race, color, religion, national origin or ethnicity.  As mentioned earlier, the 
crime must occur on federal property or during certain protected activities.  Interestingly, 
one of those protected activities is putting fuel in your vehicle at a gas station. 
 A federal prosecutor recalled a case in which an African-American man was 
assaulted while pumping gas at a gas station.  The suspects, two white males, uttered 
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racial epithets as they approached the man, and then slashed his throat.  The suspects 
were later arrested. The victim, despite being badly wounded, survived, and an account of 
the attack appeared in the local paper.  Because the crime occurred where it did, and 
against whom it did, it qualified for prosecution as a hate crime under federal law.  The 
US Attorney’s Office, perhaps intrigued by the challenges of the unusual circumstances, 
chose to take the case.  The suspects admitted stabbing the victim, and confessed that 
they had uttered racial slurs before doing so. Their defense seemed odd: They claimed 
that the victim’s presence at the gas station was incidental to the crime.  The counsel for 
the defense argued that the stabbing could just have easily happened on the open street. A 
more common defense, of course, would have been to claim that the crime was not bias 
motivated, or that the suspects did not have any reason to hate the group represented by 
the victim, or even to claim mistaken identity.  But, these suspects had already confessed; 
they were convicted and sentenced to federal prison. 
 Federal sentencing in hate crime cases is complicated by systems of “points” and 
“levels.”  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established a commission that empowered 
the establishment of guidelines and practices for federal judges, prosecutors, and 
probation and parole agents.  The federal guidelines establish base offense levels, 
applicable in every district court, for every federal offense.  That base level determines 
the number of “points” each crime rates – in the same way that different traffic offenses 
can cause different numbers of points to be charged against someone’s driver’s license.   
Points are added (or subtracted) according to the gravity of the crime, the behavior of the 
accused, his or her background, character and criminal history, even whether or not the 
defendant admits involvement.  The ultimate total of points assigned to the accused is 
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reported to the sentencing judge, and in most cases a judge imposes a sentence 
determined by the point total.  According to one federal probation officer, a point total of 
forty three or higher means life imprisonment. (Laurie McAnulty, personal interview, 
Sept. 6, 2002).6   
Under federal law, if it has been proved that any crime was bias-motivated, an 
enhancement can be added to a defendant’s sentence. As mentioned previously, under 28 
USC 994, if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was 
committed “based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation,” the sentence is increased based on 
moving the convicted suspect’s potential sentence up three “levels,” another somewhat 
complicated system outlined in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Let us take one 
example: 
Someone convicted of assault inside a federal park might receive a sentence of 36 
months.  But if it is proved during trial that the assault was the result of the victim’s 
sexual orientation, the defendant might receive a sentence of 48 months or 60 months. 
Federal prosecution of hate crime is not common, but when the U.S. government does 
decide to take a case, it has greater access to resources than local District or City 
Attorney offices (former federal prosecutor Jon Conklin, personal interview, October 4, 
2003). 
 
 
                                                 
6 This complicated and rigid system is also one of the reasons that more drug traffickers, particularly 
minorities, are sent to federal prison for longer periods of time, and why sentencing guidelines have been 
the subject of recent judicial review. 
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Hate Crime Prosecution in California 
Prosecution in California state court presents the same problems as in the federal 
court, without the jurisdictional issues. If a crime occurs in the state, it has the potential 
for prosecution in state court.  Under California law, once the prosecutor has proved that 
the crime was, in fact, a hate or bias crime, the sentencing guidelines are much less 
cumbersome than the federal system, and a convicted defendant’s sentence will typically 
be three to five years longer than for a parallel felony crime.  Some crimes such as 
vandalism have their own harsher sentences because of the threat that they represent to 
entire communities or groups of people. 
   
Police Training in Hate Crime Investigation 
 Although most police officers may believe that their job is to protect all people, 
and therefore adequately report and investigate all incidents of hate crime, Jenness and 
Grattet (2001) contend that there is a great diversity in training and knowledge across 
police departments in California.  Their data (1999) indicate that many police 
departments in California are without strict guidelines as to how to recognize report and 
investigate hate crimes, but sources in the California Department of Justice tell me that 
today all California law enforcement officers receive hate crime guidelines as part of 
their mandatory training.  The state has some of the strictest standards for its law 
enforcement officers, and hate crime training is required by the California’s Commission 
on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST).  State requirements mandate yearly 
training for all law enforcement officers in California, which now includes hate crime 
reporting and investigation. The training and accompanying guidelines give working 
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definitions of key terms, such as “race,” “ethnic group,” “bias,” and “sexual orientation,” 
as well as how to weigh the relevance of evidence, how to process and follow-up on 
cases, and how to prepare the cases for presentation to prosecutors. (John Balbach, DOJ, 
personal communication, Nov. 20, 2004).   
 The increased emphasis on training may be the result of the California Attorney 
General’s Civil Rights Commission on Hate Crimes Final Report (Lockyer 2001).  In 
order to compile this report, members of the 46-person Commission held public forums 
and interviewed citizens in 22 diverse communities in both small and large cities 
throughout California.  The Commission found that hate crime victims are reluctant to 
report to law enforcement or other authorities for a variety of reasons; but some common 
themes included a lack of awareness about hate crime laws, fear of being re-victimized or 
of not being taken seriously by law enforcement personnel.  The Commission also found 
credibility issues for law enforcement, which included law enforcement officers’ 
reluctance to respond to hate incidents or to take hate crime reports: this absence of 
reports has had an impact on law enforcement efforts to prevent future hate crimes.  A 
number of law enforcement personnel reported to the Commission that city officials, 
chambers of commerce, developers and others sometimes attempt to discourage police 
from actively pursuing hate crime cases for fear of tarnishing their community’s image. 
 People of color and members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-gendered 
communities expressed particular concern that hate crimes perpetrated against them were 
not being properly investigated and ultimately, prosecuted.  Those who believed they 
were the victims of hate crimes at the hands of police officers felt particularly vulnerable 
and fearful. And, though gender-based hate crimes can be prosecuted under California 
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law, they are rarely reported. Hate crimes based on disability faced an even tougher 
challenge, particularly when the crime is perpetrated by a caregiver (Lockyer 2001)... 
  As a result of the implementation of the Attorney General’s Commission’s 
recommendations, it appears that the uniformity that Jenness and Grattet (2001) argue is 
absent in law enforcement agencies across California may be evolving and is becoming 
more reliable all the time – at least as reliable as any system can be that involves human 
beings.  Enthusiasm, however, does not appear to be absent.  While there is no doubt that 
some biases may exist in certain police officers, hate crimes are high profile and can offer 
personal rewards to investigators in terms of public recognition and personal satisfaction.  
As one investigator told me, “Sure cops have prejudices, but cops hate ‘hate’ more than 
anything else.” 
Many California police departments provide training for citizens in addition to 
their own investigative personnel.  The Riverside Police Department, for example, gives 
presentations to civil groups, educators, businesses – anyone who will listen to them 
explain what constitutes a hate crime.  They address such topics as how they investigate 
hate crime, how to identify bias indicators, and whom to call if you are victim of or 
witness a hate crime. The department, along with various other law enforcement, 
prosecutorial and human rights agencies in the area, are members of the Western Inland 
Empire Coalition Against Hate.  Other agencies, such as the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, the Sacramento Police Department, and the District Attorney 
offices in Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, have developed hate crime brochures 
that cover things such as how to recognize a hate crime, how to report it, how to prevent 
it, and the eventual penalties for violation of hate crime laws. The Orange County District 
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Attorney’s Office has held community meetings with topics such as “A Hate Crime 
Victim’s Journey: The story of a successful collaboration,” during which prosecutors, 
police, victims rights advocates and a hate crime victim all discussed how such crimes 
should be handled (DA Scott Steiner, personal interview, March 9, 2007). 
Communities where hate crimes have not been handled appropriately and 
immediately have suffered. For example, in Southern California’s Antelope Valley in 
1996, young racist skinheads, some armed with machetes, attacked minority students on a 
local high school campus. When school officials and local law enforcement did little to 
investigate the bias nature of the attacks, other minority students, who were not victims, 
felt so alienated and angry by the perceived lack of concern that they began to attack 
white students at random. The fear of continued racial violence finally spurred the 
community to action and the Antelope Valley communities, schools and law enforcement 
formed a network to deal specifically with hate crimes (Lockyer 2001). 
 
Summary 
 The understanding of hate crime is clouded by a complicated system of data 
collection which oftentimes, such as with the federal government, has little to do with 
actual hate crime prosecution.  The FBI collects data on hate crime incidents from police 
agencies that voluntarily submit such statistics, and has no requirement that prosecutors 
report their successes in the courtroom.  California requires all law enforcement agencies 
in its 58 counties to report monthly, through a data tracking program, the number of hate 
crimes it investigates, along with the number of arrests.  In addition, they must report 
other important details, such as type of offense, bias motivation, and type of location 
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where the crime occurred. More importantly for my purposes California DOJ requires 
prosecutors to report the number of cases that are presented to them for review, the 
number they file and the number of dispositions.   
 Because there appears to be such an emphasis on accurate reporting of hate crime 
data, law enforcement officers receive training in hate crime investigations.  Officials I 
interviewed indicated that they take the investigation of hate crimes quite seriously, and 
welcome community involvement. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Roles of Prosecutors 
 Jenness and Grattet (2001) looked at the roles of prosecutors and point out that 
hate crime prosecutors recognize their roles in the local community, and they “make 
choices regarding the importance of the instrumental good that law enforcement provides 
within the community” (p. 148).  They acknowledge that inclusive categories such as 
“social harm” determine the likelihood of prosecution, and media coverage can impact 
decisions made by prosecutors. They also address this issue of self-interest and efficiency 
in prosecutorial choices, arguing that pressure to obtain convictions will lead prosecutors 
to try only the cases they are most likely to win.  Career advancement can be tied to 
conviction rate.  The authors state: 
Hate crimes are not attractive cases to prosecute because they create additional 
burdens for prosecutors, consequently lowering the likelihood of successful 
prosecution. A prosecutor choosing to prosecute a case as a hate crime rather than 
an assault, for example, might need to extend greater effort to gather evidence to 
show that the victim was selected because of his or her race, religion or sexual 
orientation. . . . In addition, prosecutors may view hate crime as a concept that is 
highly controversial and ambiguous and thus more difficult to prove to a judge or 
jury and perhaps even more easily defended. These two characteristics make it 
much more difficult to predict the success of a prosecution strategy.  In such 
circumstances the prosecutor would be likely to take a more conservative 
approach, pursuing the simpler prosecution of the parallel crime (p. 149). 
 
It is the controversial nature of hate crime cases that intrigues many prosecutors, 
as well as serving the community and advancing their own careers by being willing to 
take chances.  Media coverage of a successful case can only benefit a prosecutor who has 
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promotional or political aspirations. As Jenness and Grattet (2001) point out, in 
California prosecutors have increased the frequency with which they file hate crimes now 
that the constitutionality of California’s hate crime laws has been confirmed.  
“Conviction rates and guilty pleas are also increasing, which suggests that prosecutors are 
becoming more comfortable invoking and enforcing hate crime laws and criminal 
defense attorneys are less likely to effectively interfere with their doing so” (p. 151).   
 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
 In 1704 the first public prosecution statute in this country was enacted in then 
colony Connecticut. It read, “Henceforth there shall be in every countie a sober, discreet 
and religious person appointed by countie courts, to be attorney for the Queen to 
prosecute and implead in all the lawe all criminals and to do all other things necessary or 
convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and immoralitie . . . “ (qtd in Grosman, 1969: 
13). By the end of the following century, prosecutions in the newly independent United 
States were conducted by public prosecutors, patterned after the English and French 
systems.  At the end of the Civil War, the United States Attorney General was awarded 
supervisory power over all federal prosecutions, while district attorneys operated in their 
own counties, without interference from the state or federal governments. As Grosman 
(1969) further points out, “. . . at the local level in each state the independence of the 
prosecutor and his freedom from supervisory control is a unique development born of the 
hardy independence of a young country disenchanted with past attempts at forced 
centralizations” (p. 14).  
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 Supreme Court Justice Kenneth Jackson noted in 1940, “The prosecutor has more 
control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America” (Davis 
1969:190). And, while police officers and judges wield certain power in the decision-
making process, the person in the criminal justice system with largely unchecked power 
is the prosecutor. Prosecutors determine who is charged, what charge is filed, who will be 
offered a plea bargain and who will go to trial. Discretion is “an essential component of 
the American system of criminal justice. It is the element which makes the system 
uniquely American (Skolnick 1967).  As Kerstetter (1990) observes, there is no decision 
that is more critical than the prosecutor’s decision to file or “charge” a case, a decision 
that has been characterized as the “gateway to justice” (p. 182).  According to a 
commentary in the Southern California Law Review (1969), “the prosecutor traditionally 
has virtually unlimited discretion of two distinct types: (1) the power to abstain from 
prosecution and (2) the power to selectively prosecute” (Prosecutorial discretion in the 
initiation of criminal complaints, p. 521). Once a prosecutor has refused to file a case, it 
almost always stops there.  If the prosecutor decides to file or charge the case, that is 
when the adverse consequences of prosecution begin. 
 Prosecutorial discretion exists because of the limitation of all criminal statutes. 
They are, by their nature, broad mandates that human beings must apply to specific 
situations.  Case law does not provide guidelines, but develops the specific applications 
slowly and inconsistently, involving legal criteria only.  It rarely addresses the “extra-
legal” factors involved in prosecution.   And, because case law rarely discusses the 
charging or complaint process, the decisions made at that stage of a criminal prosecution 
are largely made without the oversight of the courts.  Courts generally refuse to order a 
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prosecutor to initiate a prosecution on the grounds that it is the prosecutor’s discretion to 
decide who is charged -- that decision cannot be made by the court.  More typically, a 
prosecutor’s discretion is said to be controlled by the forces of public opinion 
(Prosecutor’s discretion, 1955).  Skolnick (1967) agreed, stating that the prosecutor is 
“interested in making a favorable impression on a diffuse public – including courts, 
political authorities, and the man in the street” (p. 55). 
 Krug (2002) observed that critics of prosecutorial discretion have for a long time 
pushed for some predictability in the charging system.  He found that there are some 
written criteria for case filing and at least one state, Minnesota, requires all county 
prosecutors to establish written guidelines for charging cases.  Professional organizations, 
such as the National District Attorneys Association, also have adopted and publish model 
standards for local prosecutors to accept.  The American Bar Association and other 
professional organizations also address ethical rules in terms of prosecutor 
responsibilities.   Still, as Krug (2002) and others point out; there is still a wide range of 
decision-making possibilities available to prosecutors without interference or governance 
from external, or even internal, sources. 
 Carter (1974) conducted what he referred to in his book Limits of Order, as a 
“social science analysis of the daily activities of a prosecutor’s office” (p. xi). Using 
interviews and observation Carter examined the daily activities of prosecutors in a mid-
sized California city and looked at particular at their interactions among each other, as 
well as their relationships with the police and courts.  He organized his findings regarding 
prosecutors’ styles into four categories; 1) Analysts – those who review the facts of a 
case without particular concern for the victims involved or outside influences, 2) Crime 
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fighters – conservative, hard charging, sometimes rigid prosecutors who identify strongly 
with police officers and who saw the police and the community as his “clients,” 3) 
Teachers – those who sought to transmit knowledge of legal requirements to police as 
well as the consequences of legal behavior to suspects, and 4) Competitors – prosecutors 
who were concerned primarily with winning, exacting tough sentences for suspects, and 
bargaining for results.  Carter’s study was groundbreaking in that he used personal 
observations, questionnaires and in-depth interviews to identify the personal styles of 
prosecutors within an office, as well as some of their individual peculiarities.  Clearly, 
however, the attorneys represented in Carter’s study reflect a time when public 
prosecutors were a largely homogeneous group with similar racial, ethnic, gender, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. 
 Mellon et al., (1981) interviewed charging attorneys in ten large prosecutors’ 
offices across the country and looked at policies that determined how and when cases 
were initially charged, or filed.  They divided the management styles and policies into 
four categories; legal sufficiency, system efficiency, defendant rehabilitation and trial 
sufficiency.  
 The organizational perspective that the researchers labeled as legal sufficiency 
means that cases are examined primarily to determine if they meet the basic legal 
elements for prosecution, irrespective of constitutional or evidentiary elements that could 
exist and could ultimately change the course of the prosecution.  System sufficiency 
refers to a typically overloaded and overbooked criminal justice system where the 
disposition of cases is the primary concern. The prosecutor’s office must have an 
efficient, well-established and streamlined system in order to be successful.  
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 Defendant rehabilitation policy agencies use diversion for most defendants, rather 
than incarceration.  Non-criminal justice resources in the community are utilized to 
attempt to redirect offenders to options other than paths that include incarceration.7  In 
offices where trial sufficiency is the primary policy, prosecutors accept cases only when 
they believe the cases will be successful at trial.  The result is a high conviction rate but 
fewer cases filed. 
 Frohmann (1997) reports findings in sexual assault cases that indicate that 
prosecutors organize their work around a number of issues: stereotypes of the location of 
the crime, evaluations of the standing and characteristics of the victim, and assessments 
about the victim’s moral worth.  Jones and Aronson (1974) also tested the degree to 
which the defendant or victim were blamed in rape cases, depending upon the 
“respectability” of the victim. As Jenness and Grattet (2001) point out, evaluating a 
victim’s moral worth may not be good for prosecution, particularly “when the victim is a 
member of a targeted group toward whom prosecutors hold negative views” (p. 149).  
They also acknowledge, however, that minority victims might be perceived to be in 
greater need of legal protection.  According to Williams (1976) victims who are 
perceived as weak and vulnerable are more likely to be viewed as helpless and therefore, 
undeserving of victimization. In her review of nearly 600 violent crime cases, she found 
that victim characteristics do affect the decision-making process in the case of violent 
crimes relevant to charging and later in the case, but stop short of the guilt or innocence 
determination.   
                                                 
7 Many hate crime prosecutors utilize a system of this type for juvenile offenders, referring them to places 
such as the Simon Wiesenthal Museum for training classes, rather than juvenile detention. 
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 The findings that the worth of the victim may determine whether or not someone 
is arrested, prosecuted and sentenced have long been debated in sociology and are often a 
determining factor in any prosecution.  Prosecutors may deny that they consider the 
victim’s social worth before deciding to file a case, and argue that it is just those victims 
whose voices have been long neglected for whom hate crime statutes are most 
appropriate (Jenness & Grattet, 2001).  Punishment for hate crimes may lead to what one 
prosecutor referred to as an “organized system of revenge.”  
 Bell (2002) found that prosecutors took into consideration their own win-loss 
records when considering whether or not to take a hate crime case. According to Bell, 
“not only did such records matter for promotion during campaigns for district attorney, 
the incumbent DA often held out his or her win-loss record” (p. 165). Looking at which 
cases had the greatest likelihood of winning appeared to be a primary consideration in her 
study of an anti-bias task force.  Another view she encountered was a prosecutor’s 
unwillingness to take on too many cases for fear of “watering down” the law.  Cases that 
seemed to have the greatest likelihood of prosecution were cases where both action and 
strong language were used, but without both the cases were usually rejected. 
 Frohmann (1997) found that the concern with “convictability” is shaped by 
“organizational policies and procedure of the prosecutor’s office and the courts. The 
decisions are made within the organizational context of the prosecutor’s office, the 
institutional structure of the court system, and the political context of the community” (p. 
537). Cases may be believable but appear “unconvictable,” and therefore, are likely to be 
rejected, as implications for promotions, transfers, conviction rate and reputation are 
considered. Frohmann’s (1997) study examined convictability in sexual assault cases and 
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found that prosecutors construct “discordant locales” through the way they characterize 
victims, defendants, jurors and the location of the sexual assaults. She argues that 
prosecutors “inadvertently reproduce race, class and gender ideologies in legal decision 
making” (p. 531).  These discordant locales influence whether or not a prosecutor will 
file a case. As Frohmann points out, “if cases are unconvictable, prosecutors have to bear 
the consequences” (p. 532). 
 Spohn et al. (2001) looked at victim characteristics and the decision whether or 
not to charge a case. They likened the charging process to that of judges’ sentencing 
decisions, which may be guided by “focal concerns” (Steffensmeier, et al. 1998). 
According to this perspective, culpability of the defendant, desire to protect the 
community and social costs of imprisonment are considerations that guide sentencing.  In 
a similar vein, according to Spohn, prosecutors are not concerned with the costs of 
imprisonment, but with the likelihood of conviction, and how the victim, suspect and the 
crime will be viewed by judges and juries. These factors will determine which crimes are 
charged and which crimes are refused for filing. 
 In a similar study, Williams (1976) looked at victim characteristics in the 
charging and ultimate prosecution of violent crimes.  She found that a victim’s 
characteristics, such as sex, age, drug or alcohol use, relationship to suspect, and 
appearance in terms of being seen as weak and helpless, do affect the decisions made by 
prosecutors.  However, the decision of guilt or innocence by a jury did not appear to be 
similarly affected by a victim’s characteristics. 
 Albonetti (1987) used two organizational dimensions outlined by Thompson 
(1967); 1) beliefs about cause and effect relations and 2) preferences regarding possible 
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outcomes: both are characterized by uncertainty.  Albonetti applied the dimensions to the 
process a prosecutor uses when determining whether or not to charge a case and found 
that, in particular, “a decision maker’s inability to control others’ behavior unilaterally 
impedes predictability” (p. 294). Therefore, determinations by some prosecutors about 
charging cases are more likely to be based on routine decision-making rationality such as 
standard operating procedures, a hierarchy of authority, formal channels of 
communication, professional training, and indoctrination. March and Simon (1958) found 
that the decision-making strategy that emerges is based on routine choices made by 
organizations, predicated on the assumption that if certain previous decisions produced 
positive results future decisions made using the same criteria will produce similar 
outcomes.  Further, Albonetti (1987) states in her findings that “the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion at the initial stage of felony screening is significantly influenced 
by the uncertainty of the assessment of the prosecutorial merit of a case, which is the 
probability of conviction” (p. 311).  
 Thompson (1965) describes two distinct aspects of discretion in organizations 
which may also be applied to prosecutors’ offices: the motivation to occupy discretionary 
jobs and the motivation to exercise discretion in those jobs. He points out that some 
individuals are more tolerant of risk and ambiguity than others, but that “individuals 
exercise discretion whenever they believe it is to their advantage to do so.” (p. 118).  In 
what Thompson refers to as “highly discretionary jobs,” he makes three assumptions: (1) 
individuals in highly discretionary jobs have high aspirations and are therefore interested 
in favorable spheres of action; (2) individuals in highly discretionary jobs are not 
   
 33
reluctant to exercise discretion and (3) individuals in highly discretionary jobs have 
developed political skills (p. 125).  
 Landes (1971) tested a mathematical theory, later known as the “Landes 
formulation,” and found that “the prosecutor’s decision to go to trial or settle a case prior 
to trial depends on the probability of conviction, the severity of the crime, the availability 
and productivity of his resources and those of the defendant, the costs of prosecuting the 
case and attitudes toward risk” (cited in Forst & Brosi, 1977, p. 178).  While he did not 
test the charging decision of prosecutors, Landes examined the same types of concerns 
that prosecutors face in both the charging phase and the trial/plea phase.  Forst and Brosi 
(1977) used the Landes formulation to determine what type of cases prosecutors spend 
more time and resources on. Using the model, they expected that a district attorney would 
allocate more resources to cases where “the probability of conviction is relatively 
responsive to prosecutive effort, and for which the severity of punishment associated with 
the offense and the extensive of the defendant’s criminal history are greater” (p. 183).  
They point out, however, that a prosecutor may see himself as a public agent who 
convicts offenders for the benefit of society, or he may derive personal or political benefit 
from publicizing his convictions, even if those motives are not regarded as appropriate 
purposes for allocation of resources.  They also determined that a prosecutor’s decision to 
“carry a case forward” had more to do with the strength of the case than the seriousness 
of the offense or the criminal background of the defendant.  
 In the early 1970s, in an effort to regulate some of the discretion-making power of 
federal prosecutors, several of the larger offices of the United States Attorney began 
using a system for case management and tracking called Prosecutor’s Management 
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Information System (PROMIS).  Once this new system was evaluated in the larger 
offices, the plan was for it to then be used all across the country. The way the PROMIS 
system worked was as follows: Information about a defendant was fed into a computer, 
along with previous arrests and other background information.  The type of crime, 
amount of loss or degree of injury was also documented, as time, place and location of 
arrest.  The system also tracked the status of the case, how charges were filed, modified 
or dropped by a prosecutor, including the reasons why decisions were made.  Witness 
information and a prosecutor’s assessment of witnesses’ value to the case were included 
as well.  
 According to Hamilton and Work (1973) the “centerpiece” of PROMIS was an 
automated designation of priorities for pending criminal cases.  The computer evaluated 
cases on the basis of gravity of the crime and criminal history of the defendant and then 
set priorities for the prosecutors to follow. A “priority” case, as identified by PROMIS 
was handled by a special team of prosecutors. In addition, explanatory data revealing all 
of a prosecutor’s decisions pertaining to a case tracked by this system detailed the reasons 
for refusing to file a case, continuing or dismissing a case and other decisions.  This 
“reason data” was designed to study the effectiveness of various prosecution policies and 
procedures and ultimately took some of the discretion away from prosecutors. 
 While the PROMIS system provided a number of useful tools for prosecutors, 
administrators found that recording reasons for all prosecutorial actions was cumbersome 
and attorneys were not meeting the requirement for full documentation.  Some of the 
offices hired paralegals to assist in documenting the decisions, but prosecutors were still 
reluctant to give up their autonomy or to rely on a computer system to make decisions for 
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them.  The PROMIS program in its original state had a short life in the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, and it eventually mutated into a system that tracked defendants and court dockets, 
without the prosecutorial discretion element.   The federal government no longer uses 
PROMIS, although some states now use a system with the same name that essentially 
provides on-line tracking of cases for the courts and the public. 
 
The Complaint Process 
 The mechanics of complaint issuance vary from county to county and even within 
some jurisdictions.  Typically, a law enforcement officer brings to the filing deputy the 
crime report, the arrest report, a criminal history of the defendant/s, evidence reports, lists 
of potential witnesses and any other relevant documents.  The deputy’s job is to apply the 
law and determine whether to (1) file the case for felony prosecution, (2) reject the case 
entirely or (3) file the case as a misdemeanor.8  In the case of a hate crime, the prosecutor 
must also decide if the case warrants charging the hate crime or if a lesser, included, non-
hate crime offense will be charged.  At this stage in the process, the victim is not present, 
the defendant is not present, nor is his/her attorney. All decisions must be made by the 
prosecutor based solely on the documents presented.  While the prosecutor can require 
that the law enforcement agency conducts further investigation before making a decision, 
ultimately a determination will be made by the prosecutor. 
 In many larger district attorney offices there are teams of prosecutors who, on a 
rotating basis, are responsible for all of the case filing for that office. In certain crime 
categories, such as gangs, major narcotics and hate crimes, most offices practice what is 
                                                 
8 In some counties, such as Los Angeles, misdemeanor cases are referred to the city attorney for 
prosecution. 
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known as vertical prosecution.  In most California hate crime prosecutions, the same 
deputy district attorney files the case, issues warrants, presents the case at a preliminary 
hearing, makes all decisions about the case, and ultimately, brings the case before a jury.  
Although as many as 95% of hate crime cases are adjudicated somewhere in the system 
prior to a jury trial, hate crime prosecutors must proceed with the knowledge that all 
cases have the potential to be heard by jurors. 
 In a survey conducted by the Southern California Law Review ( Prosecutorial 
discretion, 1969) of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, deputy district attorneys 
were asked a number of questions about their decision-making policies when determining 
whether or not to file a case.  The following questions and responses were part of that 
survey: 
1. Should a deputy file a criminal complaint: 
a. Even if a case will probably not get past the preliminary hearing stage? (20%) 
b. If a case will get past a preliminary hearing but will probably be lost at trial? 
(30%) 
c. Only if the case will probably win at trial?  (50%) 
2. Should a deputy always file the most serious charge that the facts might merit? 
Yes – 62.5% 
No – 37.5% 
3.  Should a deputy always file all possible charges which might be found in the facts 
of a case? 
Yes – 42.8% 
No – 57.2% 
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4.   When there is a possible violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights which might 
cause the exclusion of evidence necessary for conviction, should a deputy 
a. Only file when he believes there has not been a violation (28.6%) 
b. File, even if it is possible that a court will find a violation (50%) 
c. Always file (21.4%) 
 The results of this questionnaire indicate that the standard of proof varies widely 
among prosecutors and that the seriousness and number of charges depends upon who is 
doing the charging.  Finally, the issue of the violation of constitutional rights is treated 
differently by different deputies.  Since most prosecutorial agencies lack written 
guidelines when it comes to questions such as those above, prosecutors continue to have 
the freedom to make decisions using their own discretion. 
 The issue of race is always a concern when it comes to human discretion, and the 
decisions made by prosecutors are not exempt from scrutiny.  In the same questionnaire 
as mentioned previously (Prosecutorial discretion, 1969), Los Angeles prosecutors were 
asked what weight a number of personal characteristics of the suspects would have in 
their determination of whether or not to file a case. Table 2 reflects the results of their 
responses: 
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Table 2 
 
Weight Given to Suspect Personal Characteristics 
 
                                                                                 Response Options 
    Great                Some                Little                  No 
   Characteristic                       Weight Weight Weight Weight 
 
1.  Occupation     6.6%    40.0%  26.6%   26.6% 
2.  Prior record  26.6%    46.6%  18.6%      6.6% 
3.  Race     0   %                 0   %    0   %  100.0 % 
4.  Dependents    0   %    13.3%   20.0%   66.6% 
5.  Age      0   %    33.3%   33.3%   33.3% 
6.  Intelligence    0   %    26.6%   33.3%   40.0 % 
7.  Sex      0   %      6.6%   26.6%   66.6% 
8.  Residence     0   %      6.6%   13.3%   80.0 % 
 
 
As the authors of this study pointed out: 
 
 According to the above statistics, many of the personal characteristics are not 
 given much weight by the deputies.  However, this data may not accurately reflect 
 the true impact of a suspect’s personal characteristics. Deputies may be reluctant 
 to admit the full impact of the suspect’s characteristics, especially race (emphasis 
 added). Further, much of the impact on the deputy is likely to be of an 
 unconscious nature. It is the writer’s belief, based upon observation of the 
 complaint process, that personal characteristics of the suspect weigh more  heavily 
 than the results of the  questionnaire indicate (p. 529). 
 
 The questionnaire distributed to Los Angeles prosecutors also addressed the 
perceived status9 of crime victims.  Two-thirds of those responding believed that the 
victim’s status has no effect on the decision to file a case, while one-third admitted that it 
has some effect.  Two-thirds of the prosecutors surveyed believed that public opinion had 
some effect on their decision-making process and more than half of them believed that in 
fact, it should. 
                                                 
9 Status was defined in the study as “community status or prestige” (Prosecutorial discretion in the 
initiation of criminal complaints, p. 530). 
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 Jacoby (1979) looked at the charging policies of prosecutors and identified three 
“distinct and important roles” (p. 75) played by prosecutors; legal, bureaucratic, and 
political. The prosecutor is the chief law enforcement officer in any jurisdiction, and the 
job by its very nature is discretionary. The prosecutors sets policy for the entire agency, 
and as Jacoby points out, “Policy choice is clearly shaped by personal considerations 
such as the prosecutor’s own philosophy of law and his perception of the prosecutor’s 
purpose and duties in law enforcement” (p. 77).   In addition, the elected district or city 
attorney is still responsible for the efficient running of an agency, while considering the 
financial constraints under which all government offices must operate.  Jacoby also found 
that “policy determinations should be and probably are influenced by the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the community and its value system” (p. 78). 
 Jacoby (1979) evaluated policies and procedures in nineteen prosecutors’ offices 
throughout the United States, and ultimately divided the types of policies into four 
separate approaches; legal sufficiency, system efficiency, defendant rehabilitation, and 
trial sufficiency.  Legal sufficiency refers to a policy where if the prosecutor believes a 
case has all the elements of the crime for which the defendant is charged, the case should 
be filed and should proceed through the system.  The System Efficiency approach strives 
to make best use of resources by disposing of cases in the most efficient manner; cases 
with potential legal issues, such as search and seizure, are rejected at filing. Emphasis is 
placed on plea bargains, diversion programs, probation, and any other type of disposition 
that will keep the case out of the already overloaded courts.  Defendant rehabilitation 
policies focus on systems outside the formal criminal justice system, usually using 
community resources, with a goal of keeping the defendant from re-offending.  Finally, a 
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trial sufficiency policy looks at every case with the ultimate consideration of winning the 
case before a jury.  This late approach requires the most experienced trial attorneys to 
make the initial decisions about initial filing.  Hate crime prosecutors may fall into any 
one of the four aforementioned categories, but most operate under the trial sufficiency 
model. 
  Most previous research on prosecutorial discretion in hate crime cases has 
focused on the various implied reasons that prosecutors refuse to charge cases.  Jenness 
and Grattet (2001) reviewed hate crime statutes throughout the United States and contend 
that hate crime statutes are designed to protect those who have previously been ignored as 
victims, but they do not address how the prosecutors actually accomplish this. Previous 
studies may indicate that some prosecutors file or refuse to file cases for reasons that are 
almost universal. Hernandez (1990) suggests that there is unconscious racism in the 
decision of whether or not to prosecute bias crimes, favoring white victims over 
nonwhites. Statistics clearly indicate that hate crime victims are more likely to be black 
than a member of any of the other protected groups, but those same statistics do not 
reveal the victim characteristics in the cases that actually go forward.  
 My work looks at not only the prosecutors who file the obvious cases, but those 
who are willing to charge and ultimately try the difficult cases that don’t fit neatly into 
any previously defined category or bureaucratic framework.  In the following chapters, I 
looked at the individuals; who they are, why they have chosen hate crime prosecution as 
a specialty, their backgrounds and personal characteristics, and what determines for them 
a chargeable case.  
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Summary 
 It is clear that there is no concrete and identifiable determinant of prosecutability 
that can be applied across the board to all prosecutors and cases, and as mentioned 
before, a prosecutor’s personal and professional discretion carries with it the ability to 
make decisions that go unchecked.  Some of the determinants of prosecutability 
identified by previous scholars as well as during my own research, however, are listed 
below.  The first four determinants are the most salient, while the remaining nine, in no 
particular order, weigh less heavily: 
Most salient: 
• Likelihood of conviction at trial 
• Suspect’s affiliation with racist groups (memberships/tattoos) 
• Hate speech in combination with crime 
• Previous record of suspect 
Weigh less heavily: 
• Helplessness of victim 
• Public outcry/Media involvement 
• “Worth” of the victim 
• Occupation of victim 
• Victim’s age 
• Victim’s race, especially compared to race of potential jurors/community 
• Victim’s sexuality in relation to conservative/liberal community makeup 
• Status and believability of witnesses 
• Relationship of suspect to victim 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Introduction 
 My purpose and goal of this research is to identify variables that impact the 
decision-making processes of hate crime prosecutors in California.  Although limited 
previous research has been conducted on outside influences that affect prosecutors, 
structural conditions among prosecutors’ offices, and other concerns, I seek to, as well, 
uncover more personal variables that may enter into their day-to-day considerations when 
they review bias crime cases.  Based on interviews that I conducted between June 2006 
and March 2008, I examine their political and career motives, as well as their personal 
feelings about their work and the victims they represent.  In the first section I describe 
grounded theory and how I use it in this study.  Next, I describe the method used to 
identify prosecutors for interview, the manner in which they were interviewed and the 
types of questions asked.  Finally, I describe the hate crime scenarios that each prosecutor 
was asked to review for determination of suitability for prosecution. 
 
Grounded Theory 
 Grounded theory begins with a research situation without a particular theory to 
explore or hypothesis to test.  Although I first examined a number of theoretical 
approaches, I could not find an applicable theory that adequately applied to the issues that 
I had chosen to address in my study.  The resulting grounded theory approach led me to 
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discover patterns and themes that were implicit in my data, and to identify emerging 
theories as I discovered and substantiated them through my research. As Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) point out: 
 A grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the 
 phenomenon it represents.  That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally 
 verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that 
 phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory all stand in 
 reciprocal relation to each other. One does not begin with a theory, then prove it. 
 Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area that is 
 allowed to emerge. (p. 23). 
 
 Bogdan and Taylor (1998) describe the work of qualitative methodology as 
interpreting and explaining “the meanings people attach to their lives” (p. 7).  Since the 
large portion of my work deals with prosecutor motivations and personal feelings about 
their work, this type of research was particularly applicable. According to Taylor and 
Bogdan (1998), “interviewing is well-suited for studies in which researchers have a 
relatively clear sense of their interests and the kinds of questions they wish to pursue” (p. 
91).   Qualitative interviews with semi-structured questions allowed the participants 
freedom to express their views about their work in ways that questionnaires or participant 
observation would not and produced unanticipated patterns in prosecutors’ approaches to 
their work.  
 
Selection of Participants 
 DOJ has published a document titled Hate Crimes in California annually since the 
state began collecting data in 1995. In order to identify prosecutors who were 
experienced with hate crime cases, I used DOJ’s Hate Crimes in California for the years 
2004, 2005 and 2006 (Lockyer, 2005, 2006: Brown, 2007) to determine where the most 
cases were referred to prosecutorial offices, and to identify the cities and counties where 
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most hate crime prosecution occurred.  California has 58 counties, each with an elected 
district attorney. Eight California cities also have city attorneys who prosecute 
misdemeanor crimes, while all felony cases are handled by the corresponding district 
attorney offices.  In those areas with city attorneys, unless the crime is clearly a 
misdemeanor, hate crime cases are usually first reviewed by the district attorney in the 
given county, then routed to the city attorney if the case does not meet the prosecutor’s 
criteria for felony prosecution. 
 Because California has relatively few hate crimes (when compared to all felony 
cases), only a handful of prosecutorial agencies have much experience in dealing with 
them on a regular basis.  In 2005, of the 58 county district attorneys and eight elected city 
attorneys, 31 filed no hate crimes at all (most of those also had no cases referred to them). 
A total of 12 offices filed one or two cases and of the remaining 24 District Attorney and 
City Attorney offices, the mean number of cases filed was 14. The mean number of hate 
crime cases that reached disposition in the year 2005 was even smaller.10  Of the 66 
counties and cities that submitted data to DOJ in 2005, 31 reported hate crime 
dispositions, and less than two-thirds of those offices, 19, adjudicated more than two 
cases during the year.  The mean number of cases that reached disposition in the 
remaining offices, where prosecutors file three or more cases per year, was 13 - a 
miniscule number compared to the numbers of other cases they see daily.11 Los Angeles 
County and City Attorney offices, accounted for more than one-third of all hate crime 
cases filed in California in the years 2000-2006.   
                                                 
10 Filings and dispositions in a given year cannot be compared, as they rarely represent the same cases. A 
case filed in a given year may or may not reach disposition that same year – in most cases it will not. 
11 Statistics are similar for 2004-2006, with the same counties prosecuting the most hate crimes. 
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 To give perspective to the relatively small number of hate crimes that are filed in 
California, between the years 2000-2006, California district and city attorneys prosecuted 
a total of  3,137 hate crime cases statewide (Brown, 2007). By contrast, however, in the 
year 2005 alone, California prosecutors filed more than 270,000 felony cases against 
adults12.  This number still does not take into account juvenile felonies or any 
misdemeanor cases. Figure 2 shows 2005 California hate crime filings mapped by 
county. 
Figure 2 – Hate Crime Filings by County 200513 
 
Values N
0 T o 1 (31)
2 T o 5 (13)
6 T o 112 (14)
Missing Data
Filed -- Filed
 
          (Source: Hate Crime in California, 2006. CA Dept of Justice.) 
 
 Part one of my research consisted of in-depth interviews of hate crime prosecutors 
in some of the county district attorney and city attorney offices where the number of hate 
crimes cases filed in each county for each of the years 2005 was six or more.  While the 
                                                 
12 2005 is the most recent year for which complete arrest and prosecution data are available. 
13 Cases filed by city attorneys are included in the appropriate county’s data. 
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mean number of cases (14) was higher and I at first considered only interviews in 
counties with numbers higher than the mean, Los Angeles County’s numbers act as an 
outlier which skews the mean.  Therefore, removing the counties where fewer than three 
were filed, I used the resulting median of six as a benchmark from which I chose the 
counties for potential interviews. Fourteen counties prosecuted more than six hate crimes 
cases in each of the years 2004-2006 and represent prosecutorial offices throughout the 
state of California with the most experience in dealing with hate crime cases. These are 
the same offices that have traditionally prosecuted the most hate crime cases since data 
collection began in 1995.  
 Once I had identified the offices that were to be included in my sample, I began 
with jurisdictions where I had some prior professional relationship through my 
employment as a Special Agent with the California Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Narcotic Enforcement during the years 1979-1995.  This relationship permitted me an 
entrée to the offices and established previous credibility with the prosecutors.  Once those 
interviews were completed, I asked for referrals to other hate crime prosecutors in the 
other counties that I had previously identified.  Because hate crime prosecution is so 
specialized, many agencies have formed working groups that meet regularly, and 
prosecutors talk by telephone to discuss cases and share information and expertise. 
Therefore, most hate crime prosecutors throughout the state know each other, particularly 
in the counties that see a lot of bias crime. 
 In areas where I did not have an introduction from another hate crime prosecutor, 
I obtained the name of the appropriate prosecutor from websites. I then contacted the 
prosecutors by telephone or letter and requested an interview.  If, after a conversation 
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with a prosecutor, I learned that he or she did not have much experience prosecuting hate 
crimes, even though DOJ statistics made it appear otherwise I removed that person from 
the sample.  For instance, one particular county prosecuted several hate crimes during a 
certain year and none the next year.  For that reason, since my interviews took place over 
several date reporting periods, I continuously reviewed hate crime reporting statistics in 
order to reach the most experienced prosecutors. 
 
Sample 
 My sample of 18 prosecutors was composed of both male and females; persons 
who are white, African American, Hispanic and Asian.  There were both heterosexual 
and homosexual individuals, while two prosecutors declined to state sexual orientation. 
Some of the participants were married, while others were not, and some were single with 
children or married with no children.  Table 3-A through 3-E show the demographic 
makeup of my sample: 
        Table 3-A: Gender 
         
Gender          
 
Number  
 
% Total 
        
Male      14    78% 
Female        4    22% 
               
           Total      18  100% 
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Table 3-B: Race/Ethnicity 
    
                    
Race/Ethnicity 
 
Number  
 
% Total 
          
White      14    78% 
African American        1      6% 
Hispanic        2    11% 
Asian        1      6% 
   
           Total      18     ** 
           ** May not equal 100% due to rounding 
 
 
         Table 3-C: Sexual Orientation 
 
Sexual 
Orientation 
 
Number  
 
% Total 
          
Heterosexual       15     83% 
Homosexual         1        6% 
Declined to state          2     11% 
   
           Total      18     ** 
     
                                 Table 3-D: Marital Status 
         
Marital Status     
 
Number  
 
% Total 
        
Married      14    78% 
Unmarried        4    22% 
               
           Total      18  100% 
 
         Table 3-E: Parental Status 
         
Parental Status      
 
Number  
 
% Total 
        
Children      15    83% 
No Children        3    17% 
               
           Total      18  100% 
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I chose to collect the above-listed demographic information to attempt to 
determine if a person’s gender, race/ethnicity or sexual orientation had an impact on how 
they viewed their work or if they saw one type of hate crime case as more suitable for 
prosecution than another.  Their marital status and whether or not they have children was 
of interest to me in order to get an overall view of them as people, since I was interested 
in how their personal feelings might impact their decision making.  I collected data on 
where they attended college and law school primarily to get a sense their backgrounds 
and to get to know them better.  Other data, such as political affiliation and religiosity 
were also collected and are addressed in Chapter Four. 
 
Interviews 
 When I met with the hate crime prosecutors, I assured them that their personal 
identifying information would be kept confidential, and that no direct quotes or 
statements would be attributed to them without first asking their permission.  I also told 
them that they would remain anonymous for the purposes of my study, with the 
understanding that counties that prosecute more than the median number of hate crimes 
are easily identifiable through DOJ statistics and annual hate crime reports.  Those 
reports list county and city attorneys’ offices but do not identify specific prosecutors, 
however.  Based on that understanding, all the prosecutors that I contacted agreed to 
speak with me.   
 A discussion with several prosecutors who were not participants in my study led 
me to decide not to tape record any of the interviews.  They explained that the 
prosecutors would be more comfortable and more likely to review their true motives, 
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feelings and backgrounds if they were not being recorded.  Glaser (1992) also 
recommends avoiding the use of tape recorders. Therefore, I took key-word notes along 
with occasional copious notes, and then entered the data into AQUAD for Windows Five 
(2001), a qualitative software program (see later in this chapter for an in-depth 
description of the use of AQUAD).  I then identified patterns and themes that emerged 
from the interviews.  
Most of the interviews took place in the prosecutors’ offices, with follow-up for 
clarification by telephone as needed. Two prosecutors who were not available to 
interview in person were contacted by telephone.  During the interviews I utilized 
Gordon’s (1976) seven types of topic control in order to gather as much information as 
possible. The seven types are: silent probe, encouragement, immediate elaboration, 
immediate clarification, retrospective clarification, retrospective elaboration and 
mutation. I used probe notes and key phrases that came up during the interviews, for 
clarification or elaboration of ideas. The probes were used to explore inadequate answers 
in order to get relevant, complete and clear information that satisfied the needs of my 
study. 
 I began each interview by asking the prosecutor how long he/she had been 
employed in the prosecutor’s office, where he/she had attended college and law school, 
and what assignments he/she held in the prosecutor’s office prior to this appointment hate 
crime prosecution. I also inquired about previous employment in any type of criminal 
justice field prior to the prosecutor’s office. I then asked whether or not the assignment to 
hate crimes prosecution was voluntary and if so, why did the prosecutor choose hate 
crimes? Was it for career advancement, political purposes, personal beliefs or some other 
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reason?  Did any of the prosecutors see this role as hate crime prosecutor as a stepping 
stone to a judicial appointment or successful judicial election, for example?  Were there 
any religious or spiritual beliefs that influenced the prosecutor’s involvement in choosing 
hate crime prosecution as an assignment? 
 
The Process 
I asked each prosecutor to walk me through a typical hate crime case from arrest 
to case filing to prosecution and finally, to ultimate disposition of the case.  Since most of 
the cases do not go to trial,14 I asked the prosecutors to provide a description of the 
negotiation of pleas as well as an overview of trial proceedings. 
 Each prosecutor then gave me a description of a typical case, beginning when the 
suspect is either identified or arrested by police. In some cases, especially high profile or 
those where the media show an interest, the prosecutor may become involved early on, 
overseeing the investigation and orchestrating the time of the arrest with an eye toward 
the most effective prosecution.  In most cases, however, the police make an arrest and 
then present the facts of the investigation to the deputy district attorney or city attorney.  
In all hate crime cases in California, the matters are “vertically prosecuted.”  This means 
that one prosecutor charges the suspect with the complaint, takes the case to a 
preliminary hearing if warranted, and handles the ultimate disposition of the case, 
whether it is a negotiated plea15 or the case goes to a bench trial16 or jury trial.  In most 
other types of cases, one deputy district attorney may file the initial charges, while 
                                                 
14 The same is true for all criminal cases, not just hate crimes. 
15 This is more commonly known as a “plea bargain,” but in California, the term “negotiated plea” is the 
most-often used term. 
16  A bench trial is conducted by the judge alone, with no jury. 
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another handles the preliminary hearing and a third, the trial phase of the prosecution.  
Hate crime cases are appropriate for vertical prosecution because of the unique nature of 
the offenses, which also necessitates specialized training and experience.  In that vein, I 
wanted to know how a decision to prosecute a hate crime was different from a decision to 
prosecute any other type of crime. 
The following is a timeline or sequence of events as presented to me by participants 
who file typical hate crime cases, all steps of which are handled by the same person, who 
specializes in the field: 
1. Crime is investigated by police. 
2. Suspects are arrested or identified for future arrest. 
3. Facts of case are presented to hate crime prosecutor for review. 
4. Prosecutor may: A) file as hate crime, B) agree to file lesser non-hate crime 
offense, C) send case back to police for further investigation, D) reject filing of 
case in its entirety.  If a suspect has been identified but not arrested, a warrant 
may also issue at this stage. 
5. Arraignment for both felony and misdemeanors cases (once arrest has been 
made). 
6. Preliminary hearing for felonies only. 
7. Second arraignment for felonies in higher court if defendant is “held to answer” 
for the charges, based on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. 
8. Various pre-trial motions and settlement conferences. 
9. Trial 
10. Sentencing 
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(At any points from Step 6 through Step 9, plea negotiations are common in all 
criminal cases, including hate crimes, and are most prevalent at Step 7 of the 
process.) 
 After a discussion of a typical hate crime case, I asked each prosecutor to describe 
for me what type of case is more likely to see charges filed and ultimate prosecution 
in criminal court.  Specifically, I wanted to know how the sex, age, race, and sexual 
orientation of victim and suspect weighed into the decision of whether or not to 
prosecute, and I was interested to know if the prosecutors would be forthcoming 
about their personal feelings. I also inquired about the religious affiliation, if any, of 
the prosecutor and whether or not his/her religious faith played a part in either the 
decision-making or the process.  I was aware that many prosecutors would be 
reluctant to discuss personal feelings, biases, and backgrounds, but I found that most 
of them were eventually willing to discuss more personal matters with me. 
 In the late 1990s the California Department of Justice provided local district and 
city attorneys in California with a book of hate crime prosecution guidelines, written 
by members of the state attorney general’s office, which most prosecutors continue to 
use for reference.  In addition to the document, I wanted to know from prosecutors 
whether they follow any written guidelines established by their departments, and 
whether they consult with attorneys within their own departments or hate crime 
prosecutors from other jurisdictions before reaching decisions.  Finally, in a segment 
of the criminal justice system that has arguably the least amount of oversight from 
outside sources, I wanted to know if the prosecutor has the authority to decide which 
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cases will go forward for prosecution or if he or she must seek approval from 
someone else within the prosecutor’s office. 
 The final part of my open-ended interviews dealt with how the prosecutors 
viewed the importance of their work in terms of the good their actions might do for 
society. I was also particularly interested in how prosecutors see their responsibility 
toward the victims they serve, since as Jenness and Grattet (2001) point out, it is the 
weak, disenfranchised, and otherwise powerless in our society who need the most 
legal protection. 
  
Hate Crime Scenarios - Description       
 Part two of the research consisted of a group of five hate crime scenarios. At the 
close of my in-depth interviews, I provided the prosecutors with the set of scenarios 
and asked them to review them.  The scenarios are based on actual hate crimes that 
took place in California and are taken from publicly-available police reports, but they 
did not occur in jurisdictions that are part of this study.  Names of suspects and 
victims, cities in which the crimes occurred, dates and other identifying information 
had been removed from the reports prior to my gaining access to them.  Using a 
Likert scale, prosecutors were asked to rate how likely they would be to prosecute the 
offense outlined as a hate crime, based only on the available information. The choices 
for each scenario, asking for the prosecutors’ initial reaction to prosecution, were 
Very Likely, Somewhat Likely, Unsure, Somewhat Unlikely and Very Unlikely. The 
scenarios represent the typical cases reviewed by hate crime prosecutors in terms of 
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race, ethnicity, sexual orientation of victim, as well as type of crime and amount of 
available evidence.  (See Appendices 1-5). 
 Participants either reviewed the scenarios at the conclusion of our interviews or 
mailed them to me later.  One prosecutor did not return the scenarios, reducing my 
sample size from the 18 whom I interviewed to an eventual 17. Comments or notes 
prosecutors wrote on the forms were compiled into one group for each scenario and 
used later for comparison.  
 
Measurement and Operationalization -AQUAD 
AQUAD for Windows Five (Huber 2001) is a software program developed for the 
purpose of analyzing qualitative data.  Information can be typed directly into the program 
and formatted as .rtf files.  The program then numbers the lines of the text for easy 
retrieval of specific information. In this case, information for each interview was loaded 
into the program with number identifiers, such as “inter_001, inter_002 . . . inter_018,” 
and so on.  Numerical identifiers were used rather than names in order to protect and 
maintain the anonymity of the participants.  
     In the first phase of the data analysis, I established an initial list of codes to represent 
personal and professional information I received from the participants.  I coded for sex, 
race, age, marital status, children, sexuality, undergraduate education, law school 
attended, political affiliation, years working hate crimes and total years with the district 
or city attorney offices. 
 I then organized some of the first codes into more general categories in order to 
group responses, such as those who attended college or law school in California or out of 
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state.  It was not necessary to identify exactly which schools they attended, and I 
compared my results with those of Carter (1974) as described later in this chapter.   
 I also manually reviewed the documents for themes, such as a prosecutor 
indicating that he had a positive or negative working relationship with the media and 
recoded such statements into “likes media” or “dislikes media.”  I did the same review 
and eventual recoding for themes such as how a prosecutor related to victims and how he 
spoke about cases, particularly in terms of victims or suspects. This step was difficult due 
to the fact that I did not recognize the pattern of responses until I was about halfway 
through my interviews. 
I entered key words, phrases and demographic information on each prosecutor into 
AQUAD at the conclusion of each interview, after I had left the interview site. The 
following are typical examples of descriptions of two prosecutors and their 
responses/comments during the interview, as entered into AQUAD: 
Male, white, 45 years, undergraduate University of Arizona, law school Hastings, 
heterosexual, married, two children, 4 years HC (hate crime), 8 years DA, 
Democrat, somewhat religious, talks about victims when asked about cases, likes 
challenge, likes to visit crime scenes to get feel for situation, likes to work with 
press, job is exciting, plans career as prosecutor, might consider judgeship later, 
innovative sentences, likes trials, likes juries, described differences in trying 
victims as racial minorities vs. gays as victims. Enthusiastic. Plea bargains a large 
part of work.  Considers evidence of victim’s status, takes into consideration 
statements of suspects to prove motive. 
 
Male, white, 50 years, undergraduate Cal State Sacramento, law school Univ of 
San Francisco, heterosexual, married, four children, 5 years HC, 25 years DA, 
Republican, somewhat religious, talks about suspects, talks about procedure, 
complains about press, follows guidelines strictly, same political as DA, wants to 
be judge, prefers to plea bargain, complains about juries wanting too much, 
discusses procedure when asked about cases. Not enthusiastic about work.  Feels 
overworked. Cases with clear evidence of victim’s status more likely to be 
prosecuted. 
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I also entered anecdotes that prosecutors related, as well as statements that I could 
later use for the purpose of quotation.  Most prosecutors gave general (and sometimes 
detailed) descriptions of cases that they had prosecuted and I summarized the 
information provided for purposes of entry into the Memo category of the software 
program. Once I completed some of the interviews and entered the associated 
information and narratives, I ran linkages in AQUAD between key words. I also ran 
linkages at two subsequent stages during the process and then again after all the 
interviews were completed. I continuously analyzed my data using the constant 
comparison method of grounded theory in order to discover any other theory implicit 
in the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Charmaz 1983).  Using the software program, I 
looked for the following themes and patterns: 
• The background and experience of the prosecutors   
• Patterns of decision making (including, but not limited to: victim/suspect  
race, sex, socio-economic status, sexual orientation) 
• Patterns of outside influence, such as media, victim rights groups 
• Patterns of personal or political aspirations of the prosecutors 
• Types of cases that are more likely to be prosecuted as hate crimes. 
• Patterns in how the prosecutors view the work that they do, and how they 
view victims. 
• Methods used by prosecutors that are similar or different than their 
counterpart in other areas of the state. 
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Hate Crime Scenarios- Measurement 
 I used a Likert scale to determine the amount of agreement or disagreement (on a 
five point scale) with the likelihood of prosecution for the hate crime scenarios in Part 
two of my study.  Prosecutors’ responses were compared with one another using cross 
tabs and frequencies. The size of the sample was N=17. Their responses were based 
solely on the information presented to them in the scenarios, which is often the most 
initial information a prosecutor has before deciding to file a case. The responses are 
limited to the information presented to the participants.   
 I examined the various ways that prosecutors viewed the scenarios and the extent, 
if any, of their agreement about the suitability for prosecution of each of the cases. I 
was also interested in the comments the prosecutors made about each case.  
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I explained how I selected the participants for my interviews, how 
I approached the interviews and how they were conducted. I describe the questions 
that I asked the prosecutors as I attempted to ascertain why they do the jobs that they 
do, how they do those jobs and how their personal characteristics and beliefs may 
impact their work.  I explored the timeline of prosecution from arrest to conviction or 
acquittal and the various stages at which a disposition can be agreed upon by the 
prosecution and defense.   
 Code words, narratives and other pertinent data were entered in AQUAD, a 
qualitative software program, and I used that information to look for themes and 
patterns among the responses given by the prosecutors.  About halfway through all 
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the interviews, when I rank linkages and compared observations that I made of the 
prosecutors, I began to observe two distinct types of participants.  I examined 
statements made by the prosecutors that might indicate any difference among them 
that had not previously been identified by other researchers. Finally, I looked for 
patterns among the responses to the hate crime scenarios. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction  
 An observer might ask why any prosecutor make the effort to charge a somewhat 
simple case as a more complicated hate crime?  The burden of proof is greater, and there 
is a greater likelihood of losing a case. According to the prosecutors I interviewed, the 
answer is simple.  The cases are challenging, “sexy” as one told me, and they represent 
crimes against entire communities, in addition to the victim.  Both the federal and state 
prosecutors I interviewed saw prosecuting hate crime cases as attacking a greater evil and 
promoting a greater good.  They also make great press (although television cameras are 
not permitted in federal courtrooms), and the message may be spread to others who might 
perpetrate similar crimes.  If the sanctions are great enough, people will be deterred from 
committing crime.  This is what prosecutors of hate crimes hope to accomplish, and as 
one told me, “it guards against the type of hatred that has gotten out of control.” 
 During this study I interviewed 18 county and city prosecutors, all with at least 
four years of experience prosecuting hate crimes, as well as five years of other types of 
prosecuting duties. The respondents included both men and women, both heterosexual 
and homosexual, ranging in age from 35-56. They were mostly white, which is 
representative of the elected officials for whom they work.17  Respondents were both 
married and single, with and without children, and considered themselves to be both 
                                                 
17 Of the largest 15 District and City Attorney offices in California, all except one (an African American), 
are white, and all but one are apparently heterosexual. One-third are women, one is Hispanic, and one is 
openly gay. 
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religious and non-religious. They represented both major political parties; Democratic 
and Republican, as well as Independent. They also described themselves as non-political 
or apolitical.  The primary difference I observed was the two types of approaches to the 
work, which I have labeled procedural and personal. 
 
The Prosecutor 
 The typical hate crime prosecutor is a white male with more than 10 years of 
prosecuting experience.  Although I interviewed four women prosecutors, for the 
purposes of this study, I will use the pronoun “he” to signify both male and female 
participants, in order to maintain the anonymity of all those concerned.  He earned his 
undergraduate degree at a variety of colleges, both in-state and out-of-state, but most 
prosecutors attended California public law schools.  This finding replicates the 
observations of Carter (1974) in his study of prosecutors in a California district attorney’s 
office, where he found that the majority of his participants also earned their law degrees 
from in-state law schools.  Most prosecutors were either raised in California or moved to 
the state to attend law school and then stayed to begin their law careers.  The majority of 
them started at the prosecutor’s office right out of law school, or had brief jobs 
elsewhere, such as police officer or clerking for judges, before joining the organization. 
 The subject of political affiliation was sometimes a touchy one. Several 
prosecutors admitted to being strong law-and-order Republicans, while others said that 
though Republicans, they leaned to a more middle of the road political philosophy.  Since 
California voter registration no longer requires that a voter declare a political party, 
several of the participants indicated that they checked the “Decline to State” box when 
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registering to vote.  A nearly equal number of prosecutors indicated that they were either 
registered Democrats or were more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate in major 
elections. And, while some of the prosecutors told me that they were member of the same 
political party as the elected district attorney or city attorney for whom they worked, 
many were members of a different political party.  The most common observation made 
by the prosecutors was that the highest level of prosecutor, such as an assistant district 
attorney, was more likely to be affiliated with the same political party as the elected D.A.  
Table 4 shows the breakdown of reported political affiliation of the participants:  
 
                     Table 4  
         Political Affiliation 
 
Affiliation 
     Number  % Total
   
Democrat      6   33% 
Republican      5   28% 
Independent      4   22% 
Other/Nonpolitical      3   17% 
 
Total 
  
   18 
 
 100% 
 
Although none of the participants expressed any aspirations to run for future 
public office, and none had any immediate plans to run for judge, several indicated that 
they would not rule out a judgeship in the future.  In fact, one hate crime prosecutor, with 
whom I had spoken on the telephone in 2004, was appointed as a Superior Court judge a 
few months later.  Three others expressed a desire to become judges in the future because 
they felt that they had accomplished all that they could within their current positions and 
saw no further upward mobility within their organizations.  They admitted that the high 
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visibility of the hate crime position might help get their work as prosecutors noticed 
while work in other assignments might be overlooked. 
 The notion that prosecuting hate crimes is high profile was also what compelled 
several of the prosecutors to volunteer for the assignment.  Because of the vertical 
prosecution aspect of it, which includes little or no oversight by supervisors, many 
prosecutors felt that an assignment such as hate crimes was an indication that they were 
more experienced and more capable.  Others, however, saw the job as a challenge 
because of the relatively new and untested legal aspect of the type of prosecution.  One 
prosecutor in particular told me that he was excited to take on the types of cases that had 
not been handled before and was not afraid of challenges to the law that might ensue: in 
fact, he welcomed them.  This prosecutor was one of two among my participants who did 
not volunteer for the assignment, but was asked by the district or city attorney if he would 
take the job.  Table 5 is a breakdown of primary reasons given by the prosecutors for why 
they took their hate crime assignments: 
 
        Table 5  
         Primary Reason for Hate Crime Assignment 
Reason Number % Total
   
Liked high profile      4   22% 
Upward mobility      3   17% 
Needed change      6   33% 
Asked by DA      2   11% 
Personal feelings      3   17% 
   
Total    18  100% 
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 Most of the prosecutors I interviewed were married with children of various ages. 
When asked about sexual orientation, several prosecutors were quick to tell me that while 
they, themselves, were heterosexual, the district/city attorney’s office in which they 
worked had at least one prosecutor who would be considered a sexual orientation 
minority. Since this topic was usually addressed during the discussion of the sexual 
orientation of victims of hate crimes, it appeared that the prosecutors wanted me to know 
that the office exhibited sensitivity toward gay and lesbian victims, even if the prosecutor 
himself was heterosexual.  Interestingly, the prosecutors whom I have labeled later in this 
study as procedural were more likely to make a point of telling me that their offices 
employed gay or lesbian prosecutors.  Two prosecutors declined to discuss sexual 
orientation. 
 More than two-thirds of the prosecutors I interviewed indicated that they 
considered themselves to be very religious, somewhat religious, or spiritual.  While those 
whom I later identify as personal prosecutors were slightly more open about how their 
moral/spiritual backgrounds or beliefs affected their views of their jobs, there did not 
seem to be any difference among the various participants in how they said they approach 
the work.  As one pointed out, “If I am a devout Christian and our teachings say that 
homosexuality is wrong, I still must protect the rights of gays and lesbians who are 
victims of hate crimes.  I have to leave my personal beliefs at home. No one deserves to 
be targeted because of who they are or how they seem to others.”  Table 6 is a breakdown 
of their responses:  
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            Table 6 
        Religiosity 
Religious Beliefs Number  % Total
   
Very religious      1     6% 
Somewhat religious      5   28% 
Spiritual      6   33% 
Not at all religious      4   22% 
Declined to answer      2   11% 
   
Total    18  100% 
 
 I spent a considerable amount of time discussing the judicial process and 
specifically, negotiated pleas with the prosecutors. Prosecutors consider any plea 
agreement as a conviction, and since they are aware of the backlog of cases in any 
courtroom, they make an effort to negotiate pleas in hate crime cases just as they would 
any other case.   However, unlike a typical criminal case settlement, where a defendant 
may perform community service, pay a fine, serve time in jail or prison, prosecutors have 
become more creative when dealing with hate crime defendants.  Several of the 
prosecutors mentioned having defendants sentenced to attend sensitivity training as a 
condition of the plea agreement and those who are located in the Southern California area 
sometimes require defendants to attend workshops at the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s 
Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles. For teenagers who have committed hate crimes, 
particularly because of religious bias, the museum’s Tools for Tolerance for Teens is used 
to help rehabilitate them rather than punish, in the hopes that they will not become repeat 
offenders. 
 As mentioned previously, negotiated pleas occur during any of the later steps in 
the criminal justice process.  Several prosecutors (especially those I later identify as 
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personal) indicated to me that while negotiating pleas is a significant part of their jobs, 
they do not shy away from taking cases to trial. The reasons they gave for this is that the 
more the public becomes aware of the nature of hate crimes and the more that juries are 
familiar with how the cases are adjudicated, the less difficult it will be to try cases in the 
future.  The hope is, as well, that hate crime trials and their resulting media coverage will 
deter future offenders. 
 
Media Coverage and the “CSI Effect” 
 Media coverage of hate crime was discussed with all the participants, but in 
greater depth with those who had stronger opinions on either side of the media debate. 
Some prosecutors saw the media as interfering in their work by publicizing cases and 
leading the public to expect unrealistic outcomes at trials.  This is commonly known as 
the “CSI Effect,” where television and other portray ideal situations and evidence that 
lead the average person to expect more from police, prosecutors and at trial (Shelton 
2008).  Some prosecutors saw this as particularly troublesome in hate crime cases, but all 
agreed that it is now a consideration in nearly every case that is tried in court. 
 Hate crime prosecution is not immune to unrealistic expectations from the public. 
In a particular case, a gay man was beaten during a fight and later died from his injuries 
and other complications.  There was indication that a verbal altercation ensued between 
the man and a group of other men prior to the fight. The local police chief told the media 
that the victim had been targeted as a hate crime, without consulting the district 
attorney’s office.  Terms such as “Hate Crime Murder” and the like, headlined the local 
paper, television and radio for several days.  The prosecutor’s office, whose job it was to 
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file the case, however, realized that the elements for charging a hate crime simply did not 
exist in this case and the correct crime for filing against the suspects in custody was 
manslaughter.  Under mounting pressure from the media, victim rights groups and others, 
the office filed the case as a hate crime, knowing that a judge would dismiss the hate 
crime aspect at preliminary hearing, which he did.  The prosecutor told me it was better 
politically for the office to charge the bias crime, rather than try to convince those who 
had already made up their minds, and ultimately to let the judge make the decision.  This 
prosecutor expressed frustration with the police department, the media and the victim 
rights groups and seemed annoyed that he filed a case that he knew would not stand. 
 
Issues With Juries 
 According to the prosecutors I interviewed, there was no particular type of victim 
whose case was more likely to see prosecution in court, and while California does collect 
race, sex, age, sexual orientation of victims, the data do not indicate which cases are later 
charged as hate crimes.  As indicated in the data on victims, however, blacks are most 
often the target of bias-related crimes. One prosecutor told me that crimes committed 
against someone because of race, particularly if the person is black, are sometimes less 
complicated to prosecute because it is usually apparent that the person is a minority and 
therefore, protected under the law.  Juries are able to see that a person is black, but much 
less so if a victim is homosexual. While the same prosecutor was quick to point out that a 
hate crime can be charged even if the victim only appears to be a member of the 
protected class or if the suspect perceives mistakenly that the victim is a member of a 
protected class, convincing a jury is the ultimate goal. Juries are more likely to convict 
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when the evidence is very clear that the victim was targeted for, as one prosecutor put it, 
an “immutable state.”  
 Another prosecutor spoke of the problems with juries in particularly conservative 
communities.  According to him, jurors tend to be older, middle class Americans who are 
typically more conservative toward sexual orientation.  For that reason, it can become 
much more difficult to convince a jury that a person who is a victim of a hate crime 
because of sexual orientation deserves special protection in the first place, in spite of the 
law.  For those jurors, the immutability of a victim’s sexual orientation may be in 
question. Even in communities where more persons who are sexual orientation minorities 
live, juries can still be composed of people who are not sensitive to their plight.  One 
prosecutor pointed out that many prospective jurors are less than truthful; some lie to be 
removed from jury duty, but others may not reveal their personal prejudices in the hopes 
of being selected for jury duty on a high profile case, such as a hate crime. This type of 
concern can make a prosecutor’s job even more difficult. As one mentioned, people get 
the idea from movies and television that attorneys can hire jury consultants to help with 
the selection and hopefully, avoid the problems that arise when jurors are selected who 
don’t reveal their personal biases.  Prosecutors do not have resources for jury consultants 
and, therefore, along with all the other work they must do to prepare a case for trial, they 
must rely on the system and their own instincts when it comes to choosing a jury.  They 
are limited by the jury pool.  As one prosecutor revealed, this was especially problematic 
after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers, when anti-Muslim 
sentiment was high and hate crimes against Middle Eastern-looking Americans increased 
dramatically for a period of time.  He said it was difficult to find jurors who did not have 
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some anger or ill feelings toward people who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent, 
whether it was for a hate crime trial or any type of criminal prosecution. 
 
Written Guidelines  
 Every prosecutor I interviewed acknowledged the use of written guidelines when 
determining the suitability of prosecution of a hate crime case, at least when the 
prosecutor was newly assigned or after modifications to California’s law were made.  The 
California Attorney General’s Office publishes periodic updates to its original guidelines 
and all prosecutors I interviewed had access to the most recent version.  The California 
District Attorneys Association (2006) also publishes a book that covers current legal 
topics in hate crime prosecution as well as information on alternative civil remedies. 
These guidelines mentioned in both documents, however, are simply suggestions and not 
written rules.  Prosecutors still use their discretion when determining whether of not to 
file a case. 
 
Cooperation Among Hate Crime Prosecutors 
 Most prosecutors I interviewed mentioned that they keep in constant contact with 
other prosecutors who do the same type of work. Because some offices have only one or 
two prosecutors assigned to hate crimes, they often consult with their counterparts in 
other cities and counties.  Some prosecutors, such as several in Southern California, have 
formed a group that meets regularly for lunch to discuss cases.  As one told me, “I rarely 
file a case without discussing it with someone in another jurisdiction. There are so few of 
us [in California] and I like to run my ideas by another guy just to make sure we are all 
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doing the same thing.”  This type of cooperation becomes particularly important when a 
prosecutor is negotiating a plea and is looking for an alternative method of sentencing, 
such as the Simon Wiesenthal Center.  “_______ told me about using the Wiesenthal 
Center and he is having good luck with it.  He gave me his contact person there so that I 
didn’t have to start from the beginning,” a prosecutor told me.  
 
Charging Approval 
 No prosecutor in my study needed to seek approval from a supervisor in order to 
charge a case.  In the instance of high profile cases, the prosecutors often discuss the case 
with supervisors, other attorneys or the elected district or city attorney, but the final 
decision rests with the hate crime prosecutor.  According to one prosecutor, “Sure, in the 
beginning I sometimes ran the cases by someone more senior, but I soon found that no 
one in my office really knew much more about hate crime than I did.  I ended up talking 
with DAs in other counties and getting help from them.  Ultimately, I am the one who has 
to try the case, so the responsibility is mine.” 
  
Types of Prosecutors 
 During my interviews of California hate crime prosecutors, I found two different 
and distinct types of people. While the prosecutors I interviewed tended to be white 
males with considerable experience within any district or city attorney’s office, I found 
that I can divide them into two categories which I call procedural and personal.  
Procedural prosecutors typically see their roles in the administration of the criminal 
justice process as upholding the law, interpreting the chances of a case’s success in the 
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court system and focusing more on the crime and the suspect than on the victim.  The 
circumstances surrounding the crime, along with the personal characteristics of victim 
and suspect are elements in the prosecutor’s decision, but those circumstances and 
elements are most important in determining whether or not a prosecutor can be successful 
in court.  Personal prosecutors, however, are more likely to file a case that they find 
interesting or where they have a personal interest in the characteristics of the person who 
was victimized or feel personally outraged at the victimization.  They are less likely to 
shy away from a case because of its complexity or challenge of prosecution.  
Consideration of the victim plays a larger role in the decision-making process than does 
the convictability of the case. Table 7 shows the number and percentages of the two types 
of prosecutors I interviewed during my study: 
         
       Table 7 
    Prosecutor Types 
Prosecutor Type Number  % Total
   
Personal      5   28% 
Procedural    13   73% 
   
Total    18  100% 
 
 
Procedural prosecutors 
 Procedural prosecutors were usually, but not always, white males with 
considerably more experience than most others in district attorneys’ offices.  Hate crime 
was a voluntary assignment that the prosecutor thought might be good for his career or 
because it was something that he had not done before and he was ready for a change.  
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Procedural prosecutors were more likely to comment that media were a problem for 
them; newspapers and television put undue pressure on a prosecutor’s office and 
sometimes try to force them to file cases as hate crimes even when the law does not 
warrant it, at least according to those I interviewed.   
 The procedural prosecutor was more likely to give the impression that he was 
overworked and to complain about the increased workload that hate crime legislation 
produced.  One prosecutor asked, “Aren’t all crimes hate crimes? People commit a lot of 
crimes because they hate something or someone.” They were more likely to discuss the 
notion of win-loss record as a factor in determining how to charge a case.  Because of 
that, structural prosecutors were less likely to take a chance on a case that while perhaps 
more interesting and compelling, was less likely to result in certain conviction.  They 
were also more likely to prosecute the cases when they were more certain that a suspect 
would plead guilty to the hate crime charge or to a lesser charge, thereby avoiding a 
lengthy trial that could possibly result in acquittal. Most of prosecutors I interviewed 
agree that they try to prosecute those cases where they have the greatest likelihood of 
success, but that is true of all cases, not just hate crimes.  What we often forget, as several 
prosecutors pointed out in our interviews, and previous researchers failed to 
acknowledge, is that a prosecutor’s job is about winning.  Justice is served when the 
“people” win.   
 Another consideration pointed out to me by a procedural prosecutor is that 
charging risky cases that ultimately result in acquittal are detrimental to both the system 
and to how the public views future hate crime prosecution.  Every time the district 
attorney’s office loses a hate crime case, because such cases are typically high profile, it 
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not only embarrasses the office, but it makes it more difficult to prosecute the next one.  
Judges have long memories, as one prosecutor told me, and so do citizens. Taking a risk 
on a hate crime case because of personal feelings is just not good law practice, and 
considerations of anything but the actual case must be set aside.  Once a prosecutor 
develops a reputation for trying unwinnable cases, it is very difficult to reverse that 
perception. 
 The procedural prosecutors I interviewed explained how they carefully consider 
each case before deciding whether or not to charge it, always with an eye toward 
conviction. Although they (and person prosecutors as well) welcome negotiated pleas, 
their work must always be geared toward a defendant deciding to take his case to trial. To 
do otherwise can backfire and leave a prosecutor unprepared for the courtroom.  
Prosecutors consider how the witnesses will appear on the witness stand, how the victim 
will be perceived by the jury, how the defendant will present himself to the jury, as well 
as any physical evidence.  There is little room for a personal understanding of the victim 
or assuming that the jury will be convinced of the victim’s helplessness.  This is not to 
say, of course, that procedural prosecutors don’t get to know their victims: to try a case 
successfully the prosecutor must be able to, in many cases, defend the victim’s status as a 
victim, but it may more about that status than about the actual person.   
 
Personal prosecutors 
 The majority of prosecutors I encountered fell into the category of procedural 
prosecutor, as previously discussed. About one-fourth of them I can categorize as 
personal prosecutors, based on their responses to my questions, but more importantly, on 
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the approaches they took to their work, and in some cases, to their lives overall.  Because 
they deviate from the typical prosecutor, these prosecutors are of special interest to me, 
although it is important to note that both types of prosecutors reported similar win-loss 
records.  From the personal prosecutors, however, I attempted to learn from them why 
they saw their jobs differently and what inspired them to do more than was required of 
them by their job descriptions. 
 Two of the five personal prosecutors were women. The other three were white 
males. Four of the five had volunteered for the assignment, while one was asked by the 
elected DA. Perhaps the highly charged emotional nature of hate crimes attracts 
prosecutors who feel a personal dedication to the victims of bias, which might account 
for the fact that women are overrepresented in my personal prosecutor group.  My sample 
is too small for any statistical comparison, but it is interesting that the women were 
attracted to crimes where the helpless are victimized. 
 Four of the personal prosecutors were married and four of them had children, 
although one married participant had no children and one unmarried participant had 
children. None of the married prosecutors of either group made much, if any comment 
about his spouse, although all of the personal prosecutors who had children made some 
mention of their children, whether it was in terms of how they view their work or how 
they balance home life and the demands of the job. I found that the procedural 
prosecutors were less likely to mention their children during our interviews. 
 Of the five personal prosecutors, two were Democrats, one was a Republican and 
two were apolitical. They all described themselves as somewhat religious or spiritual, but 
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did not talk about religious values during our interviews. Several of them did indicate a 
moral responsibility to prosecute hate crimes, however. 
   When asked to talk about their roles as hate crime prosecutors, most personal 
prosecutors talked about the satisfaction they received from the job. They were much less 
likely than procedural prosecutors to complain about the system, juries, media and 
concern about win-loss record.  Interestingly, while procedural prosecutors spoke at some 
length about cases and the problems involved, personal prosecutors talked about the 
victims. This was one of the most striking differences that I noticed between the two 
groups.  The other difference I noticed among the personal prosecutors was a certain 
enthusiasm for the job, a willingness to look for innovative sentencing, and a willingness 
to connect with the victims and their families.  There was a clear difference in the two 
types of prosecutors in terms of their feelings of responsibility to their victims, to go 
outside the courtroom to visit the scene of the hate crimes18 and to enlist the help of the 
citizens and media in understanding the nature of both hate crime and its prosecution. 
 One of the personal prosecutors I interviewed explained to me why he 
volunteered to work hate crimes. He had worked narcotics for many years, including 
complicated illicit drug laboratory prosecutions.  Immediately prior to his assignment as a 
hate crime prosecutor, he spent a considerable number of years on a prosecution team 
that dealt exclusively with gang violence. He explained his need for a change as his 
wanting to deal with actual victims. He said, “Gang members usually kill each other. 
Who is the victim there? I got tired of dealing with gang prosecutions where nobody 
really cared about the victims or the suspects. And drugs?  All of my victims were 
                                                 
18 Another misconception perpetuated by television dramas is that prosecutors always respond to crime 
scenes.   
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imaginary – if I put some meth cooker away, maybe it took some drugs off the street, 
maybe not, but who did I really help?”  This prosecutor said he wanted to see the victims, 
to help them get justice, to help their families and the communities who lived in fear.  He 
objected to the term “hate” crime, preferring “bias” crime, because as he said, “These 
people don’t beat someone up or kill someone out of hate – hate has nothing to do with it. 
It’s bias, pure and simple.  They target someone because of the person’s race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, without much feeling at all. That’s why the crimes are so insidious.”  He also 
pointed out that “we are all members of a protected class,” and that becoming the victim 
of a bias crime can happen to any of us. 
 A prosecutor also told me that he considered his children when he volunteered to 
work hate crimes. He said that, as a father, he wanted to set an example for them by 
helping people who were targeted because of things they could not help. What his 
children thought of the job he did played a significant role in his decision to prosecute 
hate crimes, since they could understand how some people where treated differently 
because of their personal characteristics much more so than they could understand gang 
violence or illegal narcotics.  He told me that he preached repeatedly to his children about 
seeing people for who they are and treating others with respect and thought it was time 
that he demonstrated to them a commitment to his own words.19 
 One prosecutor discussed a number of cases with me; cases he had successfully 
prosecuted and some where he was not successful. He spoke about an African American 
girl of about 12 who was killed by some Hispanic gang members when she walked on the 
“wrong” street with several of her friends.  The prosecutor drove around the area one 
                                                 
19 Although I am using the pronoun “he” to represent all respondents, this prosecutor agreed to his 
identification as male. 
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afternoon with the victim’s mother because he wanted to see first-hand where the crime 
occurred and to try to understand the geography of the gang territory.  He told me that as 
he turned down a particular street, the victim’s mother said, “We can’t go down there, 
you have to turn around.” The prosecutor couldn’t understand what she meant until she 
explained that there were just some streets she could not use because to do so could mean 
she would be killed in the same way that her daughter was murdered. He told me, “I saw 
the fear on her face when I turned the corner and I was shocked - I take so much for 
granted that I can go anywhere I want and these people can’t even walk one street over 
from their own homes without fearing for their lives. There are people who are not able 
to move around freely. It made me angry and for a moment I felt helpless.” 
 Another hate crime prosecutor whom I identified as a “personal prosecutor” did 
not volunteer to work hate crimes, but was asked by the district attorney, as previously 
indicated, if he would take the assignment, due largely, it appears, because of the 
prosecutor’s ability.  He was quick to point out that it is not only a victim’s 
characteristics that can lead to a hate crime, but the association with a targeted group or 
the perception that someone is a member of a protected group.  In particular, the 
prosecutor showed me photos of a woman who had been badly beaten by some suspects 
because of her perceived sexual orientation. When he examines motive, the prosecutor 
asks himself, “would this have happened if the victim weren’t ______?”  If he can fill in 
the blank, he wants to take it as a case.  However, the prosecutor did state that juries are 
difficult to predict and the more helpless and innocent a victim appears, the easier it is to 
secure a conviction.  He described the hate crime victims he had dealt with in the past 
four years as “really nice people,” and told me that he bonds with the victims, partly 
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because they typically have no one else who will stand up for them.  He also feels a 
certain responsibility to the families of victims and immediately following our interview, 
the prosecutor rushed into a conference room to meet with the family of a hate crime 
victim who had been murdered a few years earlier. He said, “I have an appointment with 
the family of a victim who was murdered several years ago. They drop by every once in 
awhile and we just talk. Sorry, but I don’t want to keep them waiting.”   
 All of the personal prosecutors I interviewed discuss their relationships with the 
media, but unlike the procedural prosecutors, they were more likely to welcome the 
media’s interest in the cases, or at least help the media frame their coverage of hate 
crime, rather than resent media’s perceived interference.  One prosecutor actively enlists 
the help of local media because he found that the more publicity he can get for hate 
crimes, the better the general public will understand them and the better jurors he can 
expect in the long run. He described the media as “a useful tool when it comes to shaping 
public opinion.”  He makes public presentations about hate crimes and when the 
argument is made to him by opponents that hate crimes punish the same criminal act 
differently and “a battery is a battery,” irrespective of the victim, his response is: “Hate 
crimes are not the same.  They are more serious.  They are designed to terrorize not just a 
victim, but a whole group.  A hate crime is a ‘message crime.’  A person who targets 
another solely because of his race or religion or any other characteristic is more 
dangerous and deserving of harsher punishment.”  He referred to perpetrators of hate 
crimes as “despicable,” and keeps photos of various hate crime victims in his office to 
remind him of the egregious nature of some of their injuries. He described hate crime 
victims as those who were targeted because of “immutable states,” and explained that the 
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public has learned in the past 10-12 years to accept the law as it is and to feel sympathy 
for victims.  He saw it as part of his job to increase the public’s understanding. 
 A former federal prosecutor I interviewed in order to obtain background on 
federal law, although not part of the sample in this study, told me he elected to file a hate 
crime that occurred at a gas station because he read about it in the local paper and felt 
compelled to prosecute the crime.  Under no obligation to prosecute a case that the local 
district attorney had the ability to charge, the assistant U.S. Attorney felt so outraged at 
the senselessness of the violence that he found a way to bring the case under the 
jurisdiction of his office, with the knowledge that a conviction would bring a stiffer 
sentence than in state court.  His actions, and those of other personal prosecutors, could 
be an example of what has been called Organizational Citizen Behavior. 
 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
 In the early 1980s, studies of the contributions of individuals in their workplaces 
focused on organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) or “contributions not 
contractually rewarded nor practicably enforceable by supervisors or a job description” 
(Konovsky & Organ 1996, p. 253).  Researchers attempted to determine why certain 
employees far exceeded what was expected of them without formal incentives or literal 
job requirements. Organ et al., (1994) found that personality was not necessarily a factor 
in determining OCB, but that a combination of conscientiousness, personality, 
agreeableness, extraversions and other traits were predictors of OCB.  Work performed 
by such employees is “not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system” 
of the organization (Organ et al., p. 8).  This is true of prosecutors’ offices as well. While 
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win-loss records are taken into consideration for all attorneys, they have so much 
discretion in how they do their duties that how they get to the “win” is a matter of 
personal style rather the procedural guidelines.  This type of organizational behavior is 
discretionary, another important function of the personal prosecutor, as there is absolutely 
no job requirement that states that a prosecutor must care about his victims. 
 Another element of OCB requires that “in the aggregate [the behavior] promotes 
the efficient and effective functioning of the organization” (Organ et al., 1994, p. 8).  
There is no way to determine if personal prosecutors’ behavior resulted in more 
convictions for hate crimes than procedural prosecutors, as most of them didn’t talk about 
it, at least in terms of how they view their jobs.  Instead, personal prosecutors focused on 
the people involved in the cases, especially the rights of the victims and how they deserve 
to be protected.  They clearly went outside what was required of them when it comes to 
“effective” functioning of the organization, however.  An effective prosecutor’s office 
needs the support of the community in many areas, from victims’ rights groups to media 
to educated potential jurors. 
Furthering my efforts to determine whether or not OCB describes the personal 
prosecutors that I discovered while conducting my interviews, I found that as many as 40 
different forms of OCB have been identified and measured in the past 20 years, Organ et 
al. (2006) organized them into seven common themes or dimensions.  They are as 
follows: 
1. Helping – this usually involves voluntarily helping others with work-
related problems. 
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2. Sportsmanship – Organ (1990) defines sportsmanship as “a willingness to 
tolerate the inevitable inconveniences and impositions of work without 
complaining (p. 96). 
3. Organizational Loyalty – this construct refers to promoting the 
organizations to outsiders protecting it against threats from the outside and 
remaining committed to the organization even during adverse times. 
4. Organizational Compliance – an employee adheres to all the rules and 
regulations, even when no one is watching is often considered an 
especially “good citizen.” 
5. Individual Initiative – some examples of this type of behavior include 
voluntary acts of creativity and innovation, volunteering to take on extra 
responsibilities, persisting with extra enthusiasm and effort and 
encouraging others in the organization to do the same.  The acts described 
are so above and beyond the job requirements that they appear to be 
strictly voluntary.  
6. Civic Virtue – this theme relates to an employee’s responsibilities as a 
“citizen” of an organization, in the same way that a person is a citizen of a 
community, reflecting the employee’s membership in the organization and 
the responsibilities included in that membership. 
7. Self-Development – this discretionary form of behavior refers primarily to 
a person’s efforts to improve his/her skill, knowledge and abilities, which 
may include non-mandatory training or keeping up to date on useful skills. 
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Of the seven common themes, Individual Initiative most closely describes the 
prosecutors that I encountered, as suggested by the stories I heard from various 
respondents, such as the prosecutor who drove a victim’s mother around the 
neighborhood where the crime occurred to get a “feel” for the crime.  One prosecutor 
showed me a flyer from a public forum that he, the local police department, and victim 
rights groups conducted.  The presentation, which could be called “Anatomy of a Hate 
Crime,” featured the hate crime victim, who spoke about his experience throughout the 
process.  The purpose of this forum was to acquaint the community with the problem of 
hate crimes, the work of the police department, how victim rights groups can help, and 
finally, how the prosecution is conducted.  The prosecutor was proud of the event, 
because several hundred people attended and he felt that the message was conveyed 
about the problem of hate crimes.  He also wanted to showcase the hard work done by the 
police investigators, whose work led to the eventual arrest of the suspects and according 
to the prosecutor, provided him what he needed for a successful conviction.  This 
presentation was conducted outside the normal business hours and in addition to the 
prosecutor’s other duties, but he felt it was a part of his commitment to hate crime 
victims.  
 Finally, I found that personal prosecutors were more likely than procedural 
prosecutors to talk about the cases they lost as well as those that they won.  They were 
more likely to express regret and a feeling of personal responsibility for the failure.  
Procedural prosecutors, while certainly not immune to expressing feelings of failure, 
seemed to focus more on how the system failed rather than how they personally may 
have failed the victims. 
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Weber’s Types of Social Action 
 Sociologist Max Weber described four types of social actions that may shed some 
light on the behavior of procedural and personal prosecutors (Coser 1971). The four types 
are as follows: 
1. Purposeful or goal-oriented rational action; Both the goal and the means are 
rationally chosen. Action is undertaken by virtue of a logical connection with a 
desired goal. 
2. Value-oriented rational action; Striving for a substantive goal which may not be 
rational but is nonetheless pursued. The action is undertaken on the basis or a 
value or moral judgment. 
3. Emotional or affective motivation action; Anchored in the emotional state of the 
actor rather than in the rational weighing of the means and ends 
4. Traditional action; Guided by the habits of thought, by reliance on the past. 
 
Based on Weber’s typology, procedural prosecutors fall into the category of purposeful 
or goal-oriented rational action, as the decisions that they make are almost solely based 
on the possibility of winning the case at trial.  Personal prosecutors, however, may pursue 
goals that, while perhaps not always rational (at least in the view of procedural 
prosecutors), are based on their own personal beliefs and value judgments that they make 
about the cases. 
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Data Analysis Using AQUAD  
 I ran linkages in AQUAD (Huber 2001) to identify the initial demographic 
information about the prosecutors, i.e., sex, age, religiosity, schools attended, political 
affiliation, etc.  I hand coded and then recoded for keywords, such as “likes media” or 
“dislikes media.”  I also hand coded and made notes in the margins of narratives that I 
had entered into the software and printed for review.   
 It was about halfway through my interviews when I noticed that a theme was 
beginning to emerge, one that separated a small portion of the prosecutors from the 
others.  I found that when I asked prosecutors to describe a typical hate crime case, some 
of them discussed the suspects, the law, the charging, etc., while a small group focused 
on the victims.  In my narratives it was clear that the term “victim” was used more than 3 
times as often by certain prosecutors.  I was more likely to find words they used, such as 
“fun,” “exciting,” “challenging,” and “personal responsibility.”  Those same prosecutors 
were more likely to have a good working relationship with the media, visit crime scenes, 
exhibit enthusiasm toward their work, use creative sentencing methods and not shy away 
from complicated or risky cases. The mean age was slightly younger (41 for personal 
prosecutors vs. 45 for procedural prosecutors), but there was no difference in political 
affiliation or religiosity. Personal prosecutors were more likely to have given their reason 
for working hate crimes as Needed Change or Personal Reasons.  
 At the conclusion of all 18 interviews, the theme that I had previously recognized 
and tentatively identified as that of a personal prosecutor was apparent in 5 (28%) of the 
interviews.  Those five prosecutors exhibited the behaviors described in Organization 
Citizenship Behavior, in particular Organ’s (2006) Individual Initiative.  Clearly, their 
   
 85
approach to the work, their enthusiasm and attitude toward their jobs and especially their 
dedication to the victims they represented set them apart from the others I interviewed.  
Using characteristics that I developed during the interviews, I prepared Table 8 which 
lists the characteristics that the different types of prosecutors discussed, indicated or 
exhibited during my interviews:     
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     Table 8 - Observed  Prosecutor Characteristics 
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      1     x    x     x      x     x         x     x     x      
      2     x    x     x      x     x     x     x     x     x      
      3     x    x     x      x     x    x     x     x     x    
      4     x        x      x     x     x    x     x     x      
      5     x   x     x      x        x         x     x      
      6             x     x    x    x     x     x 
      7             x    x    x     x    x    x 
      8         x       x    x    x     x     x 
      9         x       x     x     x     x    x    x 
    10             x    x    x    x    x    x 
    11           x     x    x    x    x     x 
    12           x     x    x    x    x     x    x 
    13         x    x       x    x    x    x     x    x 
    14             x    x    x      x    x 
    15             x    x    x    x     x 
    16             x    x    x      x 
    17           x     x    x    x     x    x 
    18           x     x    x    x    x   
 
In the above table, prosecutors 1-5 exhibit the characteristics of the prosecutor type that I have named personal prosecutor, while 
numbers 6-18 exhibit the characteristics of the procedural prosecutor. Both types indicated that they often negotiate plea agreements 
during the course of the adjudication of cases. 
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Hate Crime Scenarios - Results  
All prosecutors were asked to complete the following hate crime scenarios. I 
received a total of 17 surveys returned to me, 11 in person and 6 by mail.  One prosecutor 
did not return the survey. 
 I asked prosecutors to review five hate crime scenarios (Appendices 1-5) and to 
rate them according to how likely they would be to file the case as a hate crime, with no 
initial information other than what was provided. I found a wide variation in prosecutors’ 
responses to the survey.  Some wrote comments, while many did not.  Once I determined 
which prosecutors fell into the procedural category and which prosecutors were in the 
personal category, I was able to separate the scenario responses into the two separate 
groups. Those tables immediately follow the overall responses. 
 
Scenario Number One 
 My first scenario contained the victim, a male Hispanic, who is gay.  The suspect, 
also a male Hispanic, was angry at the victim for some perceived slights that the victim 
allegedly made in the presence of the suspect’s girlfriend, who was also a witness to the 
assault.  Prosecutors’ responses to this scenario ranged from somewhat likely to 
somewhat unlikely and included unsure.  No prosecutor considered this scenario as very 
likely or very unlikely for prosecution, and the responses were pretty evenly divided 
among the three remaining categories; somewhat likely, unsure, and somewhat unlikely.  
There was no consensus as to how the case should be handled.  One prosecutor wrote, 
“Independent basis for the crime unrelated to victim’s sexuality. Slurs are incidental,” 
while another wrote, “Clearly an assault, but words don’t constitute a hate crime.” 
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 Tables 9-A and 9-B show the distribution of responses as given by participants to 
the question, “How likely would you be to prosecute this case given the evidence 
presented here?” 
        Table 9- A 
         Hate Crime Scenario #1 –Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
Number of 
Responses 
 
% Total 
Very Likely       0     0% 
Somewhat Likely       5   29% 
Unsure       7   41% 
Somewhat Unlikely        5   29% 
Very Unlikely       0              0% 
   
           Total     17     ** 
  **May not equal 100% due to rounding 
                
  Table 9- B 
        Hate Crime Scenario #1 – Procedural/Personal Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
    Number of          
     Responses 
 Procedural 
       
 Personal 
Very Likely     0                0 
Somewhat Likely     3                2 
Unsure     6                1 
Somewhat Unlikely      3              2 
Very Unlikely     0        0 
   
           Total   12      5 
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Scenario Number Two 
 The second scenario involved the victim, a male Hispanic who was sitting at a bus 
stop waiting for a bus, when the suspect, a male Black, ran up behind him and hit him 
over the head with a stick, knocking him to the ground.  The suspect, while trying to 
remove the victim’s wallet, was subdued by witnesses until police arrived.  Upon arrest, 
the suspect spontaneously told police that he had beaten the “white guy” and tried to take 
his watch “because he was white.”  Later, after the suspect was advised of his Miranda 
rights, he claimed that he had hit the victim only to take the watch and not because of the 
victim’s race.  There was greater consensus among prosecutors for this scenario, with 
most indicating that they were somewhat likely or very likely to prosecute this case.  As 
one commented, “D’s [defendant’s] spontaneous initial statement provides all I need to 
prove a hate crime based on perception.  His subsequent backpedaling is irrelevant.” 
Tables 10-A and 10-B show the distribution of responses as given by participants 
to the question, “How likely would you be to prosecute this case given the evidence 
presented here?” 
        Table 10- A 
         Hate Crime Scenario #2 – Prosecutor Responses 
                    
Response Options
Number of 
Responses 
 
% Total 
Very Likely       6    35% 
Somewhat Likely       8    47% 
Unsure       3    18% 
Somewhat Unlikely        0      0% 
Very Unlikely       0                   0% 
   
           Total     17    100% 
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      Table 10-B  
Hate Crime Scenario #2 – Procedural/Personal Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
    Number of          
     Responses 
 Procedural 
       
 Personal 
Very Likely      4               2 
Somewhat Likely      6               2 
Unsure      2               1 
Somewhat Unlikely       0              0 
Very Unlikely      0        0 
   
           Total     12      5 
 
 
Scenario Number Three 
 The third scenario contained two black victims, one a young female bus passenger 
and the other the bus driver.  The suspect, a white male, had referred to the victim as a 
“nigger bitch” while she waited with her friends for the city bus. Upon the arrival of the 
bus, the female victim boarded the bus, but as the suspect got on the bus, he stated, “I 
don’t want to get on this nigger bus anyway.” After being ordered off the bus by the 
driver, the suspect hit the bus driver and said, “I’ll shoot the whole nigger bus.” He then 
reached into his backpack as if he had a gun inside and left the bus.  He was apprehended 
a few minutes later by police, and invoked his right to remain silent.  The suspect had a 
shaved head and tattoos of lightening bolts on his scalp that read “100% White.”   
 This scenario was considered by more prosecutors as very likely for prosecution, 
largely because it contained victim statements, clear motivation and for many, the tattoos 
were a convincing element. As one prosecutor stated, “Given D’s [defendant’s] tattoos 
and irrefutable racist motivation (from the very start) this is a clear case.”  Another 
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prosecutor commented, “This one would be an easy one, and a lot of fun to prosecute, 
too.” 
 Tables 11-A and 11-B show the distribution of responses as given by participants 
to the question, “How likely would you be to prosecute this case given the evidence 
presented here?” 
      Table 11-A 
                    Hate Crime Scenario #3 – Prosecutor Responses 
                    
Response Options
Number of 
Responses 
 
% Total 
Very Likely      10    59% 
Somewhat Likely        5    29% 
Unsure        2    12% 
Somewhat Unlikely         0      0% 
Very Unlikely        0      0% 
   
           Total      17  100% 
   
    Table 11-B 
Hate Crime Scenario #3 – Procedural/Personal Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
    Number of          
     Responses 
 Procedural 
       
 Personal 
Very Likely      6               4 
Somewhat Likely      4               1 
Unsure      2               0 
Somewhat Unlikely       0              0 
Very Unlikely      0        0 
   
           Total    12      5 
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Scenario Number Four 
 The fourth scenarios involved a male Jordanian and an assault that occurred in 
October 2001, one month after the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers.  
The suspect, a male white with a shaved head, threw rocks at the victim’s vehicle and 
yelled words such as “camel jockey” and “raghead” at the victim. The rocks thrown by 
the suspect hit the vehicle but no damage was sustained.  Respondents’ answers to this 
scenario ranged from unsure to somewhat unlikely, but none indicated that he would be 
very or somewhat likely to prosecute, nor did any indicate he would be very unlikely. 
Some of the comments included, “No apparent crime in California,” “Vandalism requires 
damage,” and “This is one I would like to charge, but I don’t see the evidence here.”  As 
California law clearly states,  
 “… no person shall be convicted of violating subdivision (a) based upon speech 
alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a 
specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability 
to carry out the threat. (CPC 426.6(c)).” 
 
Tables 12-A and 12-B show the distribution of responses as given by participants 
to the question, “How likely would you be to prosecute this case given the evidence 
presented here?”  
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       Table 12-A                    
          Hate Crime Scenario #4 – Prosecutor Responses 
                    
Response Options
Number of 
Responses 
 
% Total 
Very Likely       0      0% 
Somewhat Likely       0             0% 
Unsure       8    47% 
Somewhat Unlikely        8    47% 
Very Unlikely       1      6% 
   
           Total     17  100% 
   
    Table 12-B 
Hate Crime Scenario #4 – Procedural/Personal Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
    Number of          
     Responses 
 Procedural 
       
 Personal 
Very Likely      0               0 
Somewhat Likely      0               0 
Unsure      5               3 
Somewhat Unlikely       7              1 
Very Unlikely      0        1 
   
           Total     12      5 
 
Scenario Number Five 
 The last scenario, number five, involved a female black victim and a male white 
suspect. After a dispute over the tile work that the suspect performed for the victim, the 
suspect placed a 3-foot by 5-foot wooden cross on the victim’s lawn on which he had 
written the words, “Every day should be a burn day.” (In California, “burn days” indicate 
days on which farmers can burn crops, etc.)  The suspect then placed a sign on his home 
that stated. “White people beware. The nigger next door ripped me off taking food from 
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my hungry kids.”  The suspect admitted that he had placed both signs, but denied 
involvement in any racist or white supremacy groups. He also had no previous record. 
 Responses to this scenario were as varied as the available options. While several 
prosecutors indicated that they would be very likely to prosecute, others were equally as 
unsure or very unlikely to prosecute.  Some of the comments were, “No crime,”  “Free 
speech,” “Language is not sufficiently threatening and there is insufficient evidence of a 
pattern of terrorizing victim.”  Others said things like, “This is one that I might file just in 
hopes of getting the suspect into some sensitivity training. The victim has to live next 
door to the suspect. It could easily escalate over time,” or “This one deserves prosecution, 
but it’s just not there.” 
Tables 13-A and 13-B show the distribution of responses as given by participants 
to the question, “How likely would you be to prosecute this case given the evidence 
presented here?” 
Table 13-A                    
                    Hate Crime Scenario #5 – Prosecutor Responses 
                    
Response Options
Number of 
Responses 
 
% Total 
Very Likely        3    18% 
Somewhat Likely        2    12% 
Unsure        8    47% 
Somewhat Unlikely         3    18% 
Very Unlikely        1      6% 
   
           Total      17      ** 
  **May not equal 100% due to rounding 
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    Table 13-B 
Hate Crime Scenario #5 – Procedural/Personal Prosecutor Responses 
                     
Response Options 
    Number of          
     Responses 
 Procedural 
       
 Personal 
Very Likely      1               2 
Somewhat Likely      0               2 
Unsure      7              1 
Somewhat Unlikely       3              0 
Very Unlikely      0        0 
   
           Total     12      5 
  
 At first glance it seems random in terms of the prosecutors’ responses to the hate 
crime scenarios.  Further evaluation revealed that while hate speech alone did not indicate 
a hate crime, a pattern of hate speech seemed to have an impact. The uses of racial 
epithets did not in and of themselves constitute a hate crime, nor did the use of hate 
speech toward homosexuals, or persons perceived to be of a particular ethnic background. 
Tattoos that indicated some type of bias or involvement in a supremacy group were 
clearly factors that increased the chances that a crime would be prosecuted.  There 
seemed to be a reluctance to choose the category Very Unlikely about the prosecutability 
of any scenario, and in fact, on only two occasions did any prosecutor choose that 
category, one for the fourth scenario and once for the scenario number five. The 
prosecutor who checked Very Unlikely for scenario number 5 cited the case of RAV v. St. 
Paul20 in the comments section.  
                                                 
20 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 112 Sup Ct. 138 (1992). The Supreme Court struck down St. Paul, Minnesota’s 
bias crime ordinance after a white teenager was charged with burning a cross on the lawn of an African 
American family. The Court ruled that cross burning in this case was free speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment and did not constitute a hate crime. 
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 All in all, the responses to the hate crime scenarios seemed to be as individual as 
the prosecutors themselves. There were some patterns that seemed to develop, however, 
such as the agreement among many prosecutors regarding Scenario #2, involving the 
Hispanic victim and the black suspect, and Scenario #3, where a white male attacked two 
black victims.  The key to the prosecutors’ willingness to file those two cases appeared to 
be statements made by the suspects and obvious motivation.  Since motive is the key to 
proving hate crimes and what distinguishes them from other offenses, only those cases 
where a clear motive could be proven were readily accepted for prosecution. 
 When I reviewed the scenarios for prosecutability in relationship to procedural 
and personal prosecutors, I did not find any patterns that indicated more or less 
willingness to charge particular cases by one group or the other.  It did appear, however, 
that personal prosecutors were slightly less likely to indicate that they were unsure about 
whether or not to file a case, perhaps an indication that they make decisions based on 
immediate feelings about a case. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I differentiated between the two types of prosecutors whom I 
encountered during my interviews.  Using AQUAD and manual coding and review of my 
notes, I determined that there were two distinct types of approach to the prosecution of 
hate crimes.  The procedural prosecutor is a person who appears to be more concerned 
with win-loss records, the convictability of a suspect and the how the system works.  He 
is less likely to take a case that might present problems in court, and most importantly, 
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when asked about hate crime cases, discusses the case and its suspects, rather than the 
victims.  This type of prosecutor represents the majority (72%). 
The personal prosecutor exhibits what I determined, through the theory that 
emerged, Organizational Citizenship Behavior, because he clearly uses creativity and 
innovation in his practice and exuded enthusiasm for the work during our interviews.  In 
sharp contrast to the procedural prosecutor, the personal prosecutor, when asked about 
hate crimes, immediately discussed the victims and how he felt about them, how he felt a 
personal responsibility to protect them and why hate crime laws were important in his 
efforts.   
The hate crime scenarios produced some grouping of responses for several of the 
examples, while others resulted in answers that covered most or all of the possible 
responses.  The outcome is an example of the individual nature of case filing itself – 
some prosecutors see the possibility of charging a particular case, while others would not 
attempt to file it.  Once I had identified a number of characteristics that were shared by 
many prosecutors, I used those characteristics to determine which prosecutors fit into the 
procedural category and which fit into the personal group.  I was then also able to review 
their scenario choices and as mentioned previously, the personal prosecutors were 
slightly less likely to select Unsure as a category choice when reviewing the hate crime 
scenarios.  Perhaps this is an indication that personal prosecutor are more likely to take 
risks when deciding whether to file a case; at least in my study they were a little more 
certain of how they would proceed. 
Procedural and personal prosecutors have different approaches to dealing with 
hate crime cases.  Since hate crime is such an emotionally charged crime for suspects, 
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victims and the public, its prosecution may attract a certain type of individual who is 
emotionally engaged in the work, at least for a portion of them.  This may account for the 
fact that two of the five personal prosecutors are women.  For the majority of the 
participants, however, hate crime is a difficult case they can win by following good 
procedure and sound law practice.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 It cannot be overstated just how much autonomy public prosecutors have in this 
country, and certainly that includes California district and city attorneys.  Due to the 
specialized and sometimes complicated nature of hate or bias crimes, there exists little or 
no oversight for the men and women who prosecute the often highly publicized cases that 
are charged each year.  It is also important to emphasize that hate crimes, compared to 
other felony and misdemeanor cases in California, pale in number.   
 My initial review of this topic led me to conclude that all prosecutors file cases 
(of any type) that they believe they can win. Certainly there is an advantage to 
prosecuting only cases with a high probability of success: Such a record can also 
influence a prosecutor’s chances of promotion within his own department, and certainly 
can affect future assignments.  Previous researchers made this point clear in their studies 
of prosecutors across the country, and win-loss record is often cited when prosecutor runs 
for public office, such as district attorney or judge.  Researchers have found that media, 
victims’ right groups, and other outside influences can also impact a prosecutor’s 
decision making, as do the location of the crime, the perceived “worth” of the victim, the 
relationship between victim and suspect, and a variety of other factors.  Filing cases with 
a high probability of conviction also reduces the possibility of diluting the law, since 
frequent acquittals can only jeopardize the impact of a statute, both in the courts and in 
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the public eye.  Careful consideration of each case and its convictability is how most 
prosecutor offices operate throughout this country and is largely responsible for the high 
conviction rate that most prosecutors possess.  A high conviction rate bolsters public 
confidence for its civil servants, convincing them that their tax dollars are well spent.  
Filing cases that are not “winnable” can lead to mistakes in court, leading to overturned 
decisions, tainted reputations and bad press. 
 Hate crime prosecutors are not immune to outside influences and pressures felt by 
any prosecutor involved in high-profile jurisprudence.  Highly publicized cases, such as 
the murders of James Byrd in Texas and Matthew Shepard in Wyoming21 brought the 
problem of hate crime to the nation’s attention.  The majority of hate crimes, however, as 
evidenced by the statistical data gathered in California, and the FBI as well, are cases of 
assault and vandalism, which make up the majority of the bias offenses reported to 
police.  These crimes are the ones that prosecutors face on a regular basis and about 
which they must make decisions.  They are important because, as one prosecutor pointed 
out, a hate crime is a “message crime.”  One person or building may be the initial victim 
of the attack, but the message and its harm affect entire groups of people and may                                            
reach far beyond the victims themselves in the emotional and personal impact.  
 When I began looking at hate crime prosecution in 2004, much of what I found 
replicated the work of previous researchers.  Prosecutors just want to win whichever 
cases they are assigned.  However, at one point I encountered a federal prosecutor who 
said that prosecuting hate crimes is “sexy.”  This same prosecutor tried a case against two 
suspects who repeatedly stabbed an African-American man as the man was putting 
                                                 
21  As mentioned previously, the men convicted of both James Byrd’s and Matthew Shepard’s murders 
were not charged with hate crimes because neither Texas nor Wyoming had hate crime laws at the time.   
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gasoline into his car at a local gas station.  The prosecutor, outraged by the behavior, 
found that he could invoke federal jurisdiction because pumping gas into a vehicle is a 
federally protected activity as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which also protects 
interstate commerce and transportation. He used the considerable resources of the federal 
government to convict the suspects of a hate crime and both now reside in federal prison. 
 Previous research indicates that this prosecutor was an exception.  As I conducted 
my interviews I found that most of the participants were concerned with winning, and 
making a good case was the primary responsibility of the police and the prosecutor’s 
office.  The law, procedure, preparing witnesses, convincing juries, putting people in jail; 
those were viewed as the important aspects of the prosecutor’s job. Victims appear to be 
judged for their characteristics and how that will play to juries, rather than protected for 
their immutable states.  Media are an annoyance that must be handled or ignored.  If it’s 
safer to charge a parallel offense rather than a hate crime, it’s better in the long run. It is 
important to note that oftentimes the parallel offense nets a harsher sentence than the hate 
crime code, so to charge a hate crime simply because the statute exists would be 
foolish.22  The system works when the defendant pleads or is pronounced guilty, and 
although the two types of prosecutors use perhaps different paths, they both get to the 
same place – conviction.  I had not found a theory that described the differences between 
the two types, however. 
 I felt some pressure to identify a theory before I tackled the topic of prosecutors 
and how they make their decisions, particularly in the relatively new arena of hate crime 
literature.  Labeling theory suggests that “crime is not an objective property of certain 
                                                 
22 Some states have separate hate crime offenses, while others have sentence enhancements. Some crimes 
yield harsher sentences that the hate crimes to which they might be associated. 
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behavior, but a definition constructed through social interaction” (LaFree, 1989; p. 234). 
LaFree looks at the social construction of sexual assault using conflict and labeling 
theory to understand how and why certain incidents of rape are prosecuted and how 
certain people are labeled as rapists in his study of Indianapolis criminal justice.  Conflict 
theory addresses the power that prosecutors wield, and certainly the well educated, 
mostly white males in this profession are powerful, but hate crime laws are written to 
protect the very weak and powerless who are the victims of bias crime.  Prosecutors make 
decisions based on their own personal beliefs of the convictability of cases, and previous 
literature indicates that they do so by reviewing a number of factors, including the 
believability and worth of the victim, which indicates labeling.  The theory does not 
account, however, for the prosecutors who deviate from the convictability concerns of a 
case, and spend more effort and time on the victims of hate crimes themselves.  There is 
no indication that either type of prosecutor has a better win record than the other, but the 
approach is clearly different, which I found most enlightening. 
 A review of my data drove me to Weber’s four major types of social action, 
specifically purposeful or goal-oriented rational action and value-oriented rational action.  
I found that the prosecutors’ approaches to the charging of hate crime cases were divided 
between those two of the four types that Weber describes, with the norm being 
purposeful or goal-oriented rational action.  This approach most likely reflects most 
prosecutors in all areas of criminal charging, while the other type, value-oriented rational 
action, most appropriately pertains to the smaller group or the personal prosecutors. 
 Another way to explain the slightly more than one-fourth of the prosecutors who 
deviate from what might be called the convictability norm is Organizational Citizenship 
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Behavior (OCB).  I found that in most organizations, there are those who approach their 
work with a certain attitude, enthusiasm and creativity.  There is some indication in 
previous research that it could be a matter of personality, but that does not account for the 
extra effort and acts that are well above and beyond the job requirements.  Of the seven 
common themes identified in OCB, I found that Individual Initiative most closely relates 
to the behavior exhibited by a portion of the prosecutors that I interviewed.  It was as 
result of my review of OCB that I developed the two terms that I believe best describe the 
two types of prosecutors: procedural and personal.  Since I was curious about those who 
deviated from the norm, I focused primarily on what made those prosecutors different.   
 I was most excited about the small percentage (28%) of the prosecutors I 
interviewed who did not fall into the category of the convictability norm.  They seemed 
to approach the job with an attitude that included a concern for the victims that was not 
exhibited by the procedural prosecutors. This is not to say that the procedural prosecutors 
felt no empathy for victims, but their primary concern was with the case. With personal 
prosecutors, the primary concern appeared to be with the victim.  Pursuing justice for the 
victim, rather than justice for the system seemed to be of greater importance, and 
personal prosecutors were more likely to embrace the help of the media and the public in 
order to get the message out about hate crimes.  Personal prosecutors, when they 
discussed cases with me, seemed to know a great deal about their victims, who they were, 
how they suffered, and how they deserved protection.  They were more likely to show 
photos of the victims, to discuss the victims’ families and to have personal knowledge 
about the victims’ lives.  
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 Television and movie dramas give the impression that prosecutors respond to 
crime scenes, making it appear that a prosecutor knows everything about a crime. This is 
seldom true, as prosecutors receive summaries of cases and reports from the police 
officers who have responded to the scene.  Because of heavy caseloads, prosecutors 
rarely have time to leave the courthouse to see where crimes occurred and must rely on 
crime scene photos, diagrams, etc.  I found during my interviews that personal 
prosecutors were more likely to physically visit crime scenes in order to get a “feel” for 
the location and an understanding of what occurred. The example in an earlier chapter of 
the personal prosecutor who drove a victim’s mother around a neighborhood in order to 
understand what the victim suffered was behavior that separated the prosecutor from 
many others in his field.  There is no theory in criminology that adequately addresses 
how a prosecutor such as this fits into a system that previous research has identified as 
not responsive to the plight of victims, but OCB describes the certain type of individual 
who exhibits behavior that is not “directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward 
system” (Organ et al., 1994, p. 8). There may be, however, some social and political 
benefits that accrue for the personal prosecutor in terms of public and media approval, 
especially if he is seen as the protector of the weak and the champion of the powerless. 
 Personal prosecutors were no more or less likely to be religious than their 
counterparts, they were only slightly younger, the reasons they gave for working hate 
crime were more likely to be the need for a change or personal reasons, and their political 
affiliation did not lean in any particular direction.  It is difficult to quantify the way that 
they talked about hate crime, the enthusiasm they exhibited for the job and the innovative 
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ways that they dealt with cases.  It was an attitude that was almost contagious and I found 
myself caught up in the plights of the victims as well.   
 Even though these three men and two women who comprised the personal 
prosecutors’ group ultimately had similar success as the 13 men and women I had come 
to call procedural prosecutors, their methods indicated to me that they were the risk-
takers and that they felt a connection to the victims that the majority did not.  I was also 
concerned, then, with how the two different types of prosecutors would view the hate 
crime scenarios that I presented to them.  
 Using the hate crime scenarios to ascertain how prosecutors would approach the 
prosecution of various types of crimes gave me an opportunity to determine if there was 
agreement among them in terms of how they view cases. For three of the five cases, there 
was not.  Their responses were as varied as the options.  In two of the cases, where 
statements and behavior of the suspects made motive more apparent, there was more 
agreement among the participants. There were prosecutors who were unsure, while at the 
same time, several appeared enthusiastic about the prospect of charging such a case. This 
is indicative of the autonomous nature of the job and the various ways that different 
prosecutors may view the same incident.  There are few written guidelines and no rules 
outlining which cases are filed and which are not.  There was little difference between the 
scenarios rated by the procedural and the personal prosecutors, although personal 
prosecutors were slightly less likely to check Unsure when evaluating a scenario. This 
response may be an example of their emotional engagement in the work and perhaps 
indicates confidence in their abilities to read into a case.   
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Further Study 
 It is unlikely that personal prosecutors only exist in the realm of hate crime 
prosecution.  Certainly others operate in similar fashion as the bias crime experts I 
encountered in my study; prosecutors who feel freer to take chances than their 
counterparts.  It would be interesting to conduct further interviews of prosecutors in 
specialized areas with vertical prosecution, such as major crimes, gangs, narcotics, etc, 
where a prosecutor may have more time to devote to each case, and compare them with 
prosecutors who do the daily cases involving lower profile crimes.  I would be curious to 
know if prosecutors who carry heavy caseloads of burglaries, assaults, robberies, and 
other felonies can be separated into the two categories I discovered in my study or if the 
sheer volume of work precludes them from operating in the manner of a personal 
prosecutor. 
 During my study I encounter some issues that warrant further study.  When I 
reviewed 2003 hate crime prosecution statistics for the city and county of San Francisco, 
I found that only a small percentage of hate crime cases (with known suspects) reported 
to police were submitted to the prosecutor’s office and fewer than half of those were filed 
as hate crimes.  A prosecutor from another jurisdiction told me that San Francisco was 
notorious for not prosecuting its hate crimes under the then-current administration and 
with the newly elected District Attorney in place, things were bound to change.  Upon 
reviewing later statistics, however, I find that, in 2006 only about 25% of the reported 
hate crimes (with suspects) were submitted for prosecution and that only about one-third 
of those were filed as hate crimes.  It could be important to further study San Francisco to 
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determine where the disconnect exists between police and the prosecutor’s office, or if 
the discrepancy lies within the office itself. 
 I found similar areas worthy of consideration in other parts of the state.  In some 
jurisdictions, prosecutors have established a pattern of filing a high percentage of the hate 
crime cases submitted to them, while in others the rate is quite low.  Some police 
jurisdictions present a high percentage of their hate crime reports for filing, while in 
others very few are submitted.  Clearly there is either a problem in how hate crimes are 
categorized or there exists a breakdown between law enforcement and the prosecutors. 
 The notion of hate crime as a priority is another topic worth studying.  When hate 
crime first became a priority for the California Attorney General’s office in the late 20th 
and early 21st century, counties such as San Diego used federal and state funding to 
organize hate crime units, complete with investigators, police officers, prosecutors and 
support staff.  A few years later, with priorities shifted elsewhere, the specialized groups 
are mostly gone and the prosecutors are left without the additional help.  Although the 
numbers of cases they prosecuted have not decreased, the resources with which to fully 
investigate and try those cases have. 
 Another consideration for study is the changing priorities of prosecutors’ offices.  
In the early 1990s the priority shifted from narcotics to child predators and then focused 
more heavily on hate crimes.  Now that hate crime is generally understood by most of 
law enforcement and computer crimes are reported daily in the media, more prosecutors 
are spending their days trying to understand the complexities of identity theft and 
computer fraud.  It’s this constantly changing stream of priorities that I think warrant 
further research. 
   
 108
 Finally, there may be some distinction between procedural and personal 
prosecutors and the number of cases that each type is presented.  It warrants further 
research to determine if, perhaps, personal prosecutors have the luxury of handling fewer 
cases and as a result, have the time and resources to conduct more extensive investigation 
of cases before filing. Since some jurisdictions handle significantly more cases than 
others, it might be helpful to narrow the focus of study to one county agency, such as the 
Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, to determine the distribution of procedural versus 
personal prosecutors and their respective caseloads. 
 
Summary 
 I began this process with the understanding that prosecutors only file cases that 
they believe that they can win and I found something different than I expected, as well as 
different than I experienced during my twenty years in California law enforcement.  
While indeed it appears that most of the prosecutors file cases with a high certainty of 
conviction, I also found a few prosecutors who do not hesitate to take on cases that they 
believe are intriguing or crimes that are so outrageous that they feel the victim deserves 
to have the case go forward.  Serving justice means serving the victims. Personal 
prosecutors tackle the job with an enthusiasm that may be considered abnormal for an 
overworked public servant and is more likely akin to the actions of highly paid actors 
from some unrealistic television drama.  There are no policy implications inherent in the 
data that I uncovered, except to recognize that both types of prosecutors exist. There is no 
evidence that personal prosecutors have any better conviction rate than procedural 
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prosecutors, so some may wonder why their approach makes a difference.  To the system, 
it may not matter – to the victims it may feel like everything. 
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APPENDIX  A 
 
Hate Crime Scenario #1 
 
 
Victim:  Male, Hispanic, 23 yrs (Gay) 
 
Suspect: Male, Hispanic, 24 yrs (Straight) 
 
Weapon: Handgun (not recovered) 
 
Witness:  One witness, girlfriend of suspect. 
 
Evidence: Photos of injuries, statements of victim, witness. 
 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Victim and witness work together at a specialty store in a local mall.  Victim is gay and all co-workers are 
aware of his sexual orientation.  Suspect frequently calls the store to speak with his girlfriend, the witness, 
and victim has begun referring to the suspect as “Bugaboo,” because he constantly calls and “bugs” them.  
On this occasion, the suspect overheard the victim tell the witness, “Bugaboo is on the phone for you.” 
 
After work that night, the witness and victim left the store so that witness could give the victim a ride home 
from work, a common occurrence.  Suspect approached the victim, who was seated in the passenger seat of 
witness’s car, opened the passenger door and pointed a gun at the victim’s head, saying, “You fucking fag, 
do you think you’re funny? You faggot, get out of the car.”  The suspect then proceeded to hit the victim in 
the head with the weapon while the witness screamed for him to stop.  Suspect stopped hitting the victim 
and the witness drove the victim home, while the suspect followed behind in his own vehicle.  According to 
the victim, during the ride the witness admitted that the gun used by her boyfriend was actually hers.  When 
they arrived at his apartment victim went inside and the suspect and witness left in separate vehicles. 
 
Victim did not report the attack until two days later, because he was afraid of suspect’s friends, according 
to his statement. Photographs of victim’s injuries were taken by local police. Witness said that the suspect 
did hit the victim with something but that she did not know what it was. When interviewed, suspect said the 
combat was mutual, there was no gun involved and that the victim started it.  He denied using the word 
“faggot” but said he did tell the victim to “Get the fuck out of the car.”  When questioned regarding his 
attitude toward homosexuals, the suspect said that he knows several and “sometimes I even talk to them.” 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Scenario #1 
 
How likely would you be to file this case as a hate crime, given the available evidence? 
 
___Very Likely    ___Somewhat Likely     ___Unsure     ___Somewhat Unlikely    ___Very Unlikely 
 
 
Comments_____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Hate Crime Scenario #2 
 
 
 
 
Victim:  Male, Hispanic, 67 yrs  
 
Suspect: Male, Black, 23 yrs  
 
Weapon: Wooden stick, 18” long, 1” diameter (recovered) 
 
Witness:  Four witnesses, all passersby. All give essentially same account. 
 
Evidence: 18” wooden stick, statements of victim, witnesses, suspect. 
 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Victim is a light skinned Hispanic male with white hair. He was sitting a bus stop waiting for the bus, when 
the suspect (Black male) ran up behind him and began hitting him over the head with a stick, knocking him 
to the ground.  The suspect then began trying to remove the victim’s watch.  Witnesses, who had all been 
passing by in various vehicles, intervened and then subdued the suspect until police arrived. 
 
After the suspect was in custody, he spontaneously told police that he had beat the “white guy” over the 
head with a stick and tried to take his watch “because he was white.”  Once at the police station and after 
having been advised of his Miranda rights, the suspect stated that he had, in fact, hit the old man and tried 
to take his watch, but it was because he wanted to sell the watch for the money. Suspect said he was 
homeless and would have beaten anyone for the watch, regardless of race. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Scenario #2 
 
How likely would you be to file this case as a hate crime, given the available evidence? 
 
___Very Likely   ___Somewhat Likely    ____Unsure  ____Somewhat Unlikely   ____Very Unlikely 
 
 
Comments_____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Hate Crime Scenario #3 
 
 
 
Victim:  1) Female, Black, 14 yrs. 
2) Male, Black, 40 yrs 
 
Suspect: Male, White, 21 yrs, shaved head, tattoos of lightening bolts, “100%White” 
 
Weapon: Hands, voice 
 
Witness:  Numerous witnesses, all bus passengers of Victim #1 
 
Evidence: Statements of witnesses, victims only. 
 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Victim #1 was standing at a bus stop with four of her friends, also Black female juveniles, when she was 
approached by the suspect. He said to Victim #1, “You guys don’t talk to me and I won’t call you a nigger 
bitch,” and began getting closer and closer to her, forcing her to step back.  Victim #1 told the suspect not 
to call her “nigger” or “bitch” and the suspect responded, “I’ll shoot all 5 of you bitches. I have a 9mm with 
3 clips.” About that time a city bus, driven by Victim #2 arrived.  Victim #2 heard the suspect and Victim 
#1’s heated words and told them not to bring their altercation onto the bus. Victim #1 apologized and she 
and her friends paid their fares and then boarded the bus, moving to the rear to sit down. 
 
The suspect also boarded the bus and when he got to the fare box he stated to the bus driver, “I don’t want 
to get on this nigger bus anyway.” Victim #2 ordered the suspect off the bus. The suspect then poked his 
finger in Victim #2’s eye, knocking off Victim’s glasses and said, “I’ll shoot the whole nigger bus.” The 
suspect then reached into his backpack as if you get something. Victim #2 then turned and hit an 
emergency button located near the console.  It was apparently at that time that the suspect spat on Victim 
#2, according to witnesses.  The suspect continued to say he was going to “shoot up the bus” and “shoot up 
the niggers,” as he left the bus and walked away, still reaching inside his backpack as if he had a gun there.  
He was apprehended by police a few minutes later.  
 
The suspect refused to waive his Miranda rights and did not answer any questions. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Scenario #3 
 
How likely would you be to file this case as a hate crime, given the available evidence? 
 
___Very Likely   ___Somewhat Likely    ____Unsure  ____Somewhat Unlikely   ____Very Unlikely 
 
Comments_____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Hate Crime Scenario #4 
 
 
 
 
Victim: Male, Caucasian (Jordanian), 17 yrs. 
   
Suspect: Male, White, 25 yrs, shaved head 
 
Weapon: Voice, hands, rock 
 
Witness:  Several witnesses, neighbors, who gave same account as victim 
 
Evidence: Statements of witnesses, victims only. 
 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Victim, a Jordanian born Muslim, was wearing his traditional Arab clothing and had just come home from 
a religious meeting. He parked in front of his own residence and as he got out of his vehicle and started 
toward his house, he saw the suspect standing on the sidewalk and looking at the victim in a “threatening 
manner.”  The victim was frightened for his safety and went into his house. 
 
The suspect then began shouting “camel jockey” and “raghead” at the victim’s house and then spit in the 
air, as if in disgust.  The suspect picked up a rock and threw it at the victim’s car, hitting it, but not causing 
any visible damage. 
 
Police arrived on the scene and approached the suspect, who was wearing only a pair of pants and combat 
boots. The suspect appeared to be very physically fit.  He claimed to be part of the military but refused to 
tell police which branch.  The suspect got into a physical altercation with police after he was told to sit 
down and he refused. He continued to swear and was verbally abusive toward officers after his arrest. 
 
Note: This incident took place in October 2001, about one month after the attacks on the World Trade 
Towers and Pentagon. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Scenario #4 
 
How likely would you be to file this case as a hate crime, given the available evidence? 
 
___Very Likely   ___Somewhat Likely    ____Unsure  ____Somewhat Unlikely   ____Very Unlikely 
 
 
Comments_____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Hate Crime Scenario #5 
 
Victim: Female, Black, 63 years 
Suspect: Male, White, 39 years 
Weapon: Wooden cross in front yard, sign in yard 
Witness: Neighbors, police officers (to existence of cross) 
Evidence: Wooden cross 3 ft wide by 5 ft tall, staked in victim’s front yard; statements of victim, suspect. 
 
Synopsis: 
The suspect (white male) and victim (black female) are next door neighbors. Under verbal agreement, 
suspect had performed tile work for victim for which he had been partially paid, but victim refused to pay 
additional funds until the work was completed satisfactorily. Suspect claimed he had offered to finish the 
job if the victim made an additional payment, but the victim refused. 
 
The suspect placed a 3x5 foot wooden cross on victim’s front lawn (he admitted this to investigating 
officers), on which he wrote “Every day should be a burn day.” The suspect then placed a 4x6 ft. sign on 
the second story of his own home, facing the street, which read, “White people beware. The nigger next 
door ripped me off taking food from my hungry kids.” Police were called by neighbors not involved in the 
dispute. 
  
The suspect admitted that he had placed both signs, but denied any involvement with any racist or white 
supremacy groups. He had no previous record. 
 
Note:  The incident occurred in an area of California that has designated “burn days” for residential, 
commercial and agricultural properties. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Scenario #5 
 
How likely would you be to file this case as a hate crime, given the available evidence? 
 
___Very Likely   ___Somewhat Likely    ____Unsure  ____Somewhat Unlikely   ____Very Unlikely 
 
 
Comments_____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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